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                                        CHAPTER FIVE 
DESIGNING INSTITUTIONAL 
INFRASTRUCTURES FOR e-SCIENCE * 
Paul A David1 and Dr Michael Spence2 
 
1. INTRODUCTION – THE OPPORTUNITIES AND 
CHALLENGES OF e-SCIENCE 
1.1 Background, Motivation and Purpose 
The opportunity exists today for unprecedented connections between 
scientists, information, data, computational services, and instruments 
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through the Internet.  A new generation of information and 
communication infrastructures, including advanced Internet computing 
and Grid technologies, is beginning to enable much greater direct and 
shared access to more widely distributed computing resources than 
previously has been possible.3  The term ‘e-Science’ usually is applied in 
reference to large scale science that, increasingly, is being carried out 
through distributed global collaborations enabled by the Internet.4  Such 
collaborative scientific enterprises typically require access to very 
extensive data collections, very large scale computing resources, and high 
performance visualisation of research data and analysis of results by the 
individual users.  The potential for these advances in technology to 
support new levels of collaborative activity in scientific and engineering, 
and ultimately in other domains, is a major driving force behind the 
UK’s Core e-Science Programme.5   
A growing number of those acquainted with these technological 
developments anticipate that they will have transformative effects on the 
organisation and conduct of ‘knowledge work’ – particularly scientific 
and engineering research.  Thus, the 2003 report by a distinguished 
                                                        
3 General overviews of the Grid and related Internet computing are provided by I Foster, 
‘Internet Computing and the Emerging Grid’ (2000) 7 December Nature 
<http://www.nature.com/nature/webmatters/grid/grid/html>; I Foster, ‘The Grid: 
Computing without Bounds’ (2003) April Scientific American.  For further detail, consult I Foster, 
I Kesselman and C Kesselman (eds), The Grid: Blueprint for a New Computing Infrastructure (2001); I 
Foster et al, The Physiology of the Grid (Version 2/17/2002) <http:// 
www.globus.org/research/papers/ogsa.pdf>. 
4 See David and Spence (2003/2004: Appendix 1 Computer-mediated telecommunication 
network supports for collaborative research activities: concepts and definitions) on this and 
related terminology found in the text.  For an overview of connections between the UK e-
Science Programme, Grid services and high bandwidth middleware, by the e-Science Core 
Programme’s Director, see: T Hey, Towards an e-Science Roadmap, 
<http://umbriel.dcs.gla.ac.uk/nesc/general/news/ukroadmap180402/TonyHeyTowards_an_e
Science_Roadmap.pdf>. 
5 In November 2000 Dr John Taylor (the Director General of the Research Councils) 
announced £98M funding for a new UK e-Science programme: £15M was allocated by the 
Office of Science and Technology (OST) to the Core e-Science Programme, a cross-Council 
activity to develop and broker generic technology solutions and generic middleware to enable e-
Science and form the basis for new commercial e-business software.  OST funding for the core 
e-Science Programme has been augmented by a further £20M from the Department of Trade 
and Industry (DTI), which is to be matched by £15M from industry.  See UK Research Council 
e-Science Programme <http://www.research-councils.ac.uk/escience/>; also, for allocations 
to specific science domains <http://www.escience-grid.org.uk/docs/briefing/funding.htm>. 
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advisory panel to the NSF Directorate of Computer and Information 
System Engineering, chaired by Daniel Atkins, envisaged an enhanced 
computer and network technologies supporting those connections as 
forming a vital infrastructure – dubbed the cyberinfrastructure – whose 
effects would be analogous to the historical impacts of super-highways, 
electric power grids, and other physical infrastructures in raising the 
productivity of conventional work.6  The recommendations of the 
‘Atkins Committee Report’ were swiftly embraced by the NSF, which 
established a high level Office of Cyberinfrastructure and in 2005 tasked 
multi-disciplinary, cross-foundational teams to further elaborate a 
‘vision’ that would guide the Foundation’s program of 
cyberinfrastructure (CI) investments in four overlapping and 
complementary areas.  These were 1) High Performance Computing, 2) 
Data, Data Analysis, and Visualisation, 3) Cyber Services and Virtual 
Organisations, and 4) Learning and Workforce Development.  
Following an extensive process of consultation on drafts, a 
comprehensive and no doubt influential ‘vision statement’ has received 
endorsement from the newly constituted Cyberinfrastructure Council 
(CIC) within the Foundation.7  
The original central expectation animating this initiative was that the 
solution of technical problems associated with an advanced 
cyberinfrastructure would unleash new scientific capabilities – leading to 
key discoveries, such as improved drug designs, deeper understanding of 
fundamental physical principles, and more detailed environmental 
models.  With the passage of time has come explicit recognition that in 
reality, such gains, if they materialise would likely be the combined effect of 
social and technical transformations.  Indeed, the prefatory letter from NSF 
                                                        
6 The potential to revolutionise science and engineering in the 21st century is set out at some 
length as the rationale for a major programmatic commitment by NSF, in D E Atkins et al, 
Revolutionizing science and engineering through cyberinfrastructure: Report of the National Science Foundation 
blue-ribbon advisory panel on cyberinfrastructure (February 2003) 
<http://www.communitytechnology.org/nsf_ci_report/>.  On the transformative implication 
in the local, Oxford context, see also, P Jeffries, ‘e-Science and the Grid: Why it will change 
Oxford’, (Presentation by the Director of the Oxford University e-Science Centre to the 
Oxford BioInformatics Forum, 7 November 2001) <http://e-science.ox.ac.uk/>. 
7 See National Science Foundation, Cyberinfrastructure Vision for 21st Century Discovery (March 
2007)  <http://www.nsf.gov/od/oci/CI_Vision_March07.pdf>.  
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Director Arden L Bement, introducing the Cyberinfrastructure Vision for 
21st Century Discovery8 speaks less of network engineering than of cultures: 
At the heart of the cyberinfrastructure vision is the 
development of a cultural community that supports peer-to-
peer collaboration and new modes of education based upon 
broad and open access to leadership computing; data and 
information resources; online instruments and observatories; 
and visualization and collaboration services.  
Cyberinfrastructure enables distributed knowledge 
communities that collaborate and communicate across 
disciplines, distances and cultures.  These research and 
education communities extend beyond traditional brick-and-
mortar facilities, becoming virtual organizations that 
transcend geographic and institutional boundaries. 
Yet, as one pursues the specifics of the cyberstructure vision, even in the 
chapter on ‘virtual organisations’, the original conceptualisation 
resurfaces; the over-riding theme is that these social formations will be 
called forth more or less automatically by the empowering features of 
the new collaboration technologies and data resources that are being 
promised to geographically distributed researchers.  Here is one of the 
less technically detailed, but nonetheless emblematic expressions of that 
faith:9  
The convergence of information, grid, and networking 
technologies with contemporary communications now 
enables science and engineering communities to pursue their 
research and learning goals in real-time and without regard to 
geography … the creation of end-to-end cyberinfrastructure 
systems – comprehensive networked resources – by groups 
of individuals with common interests is permitting the 
establishment of Virtual Organizations (VOs) that are 
revolutionizing the conduct of science and engineering 
research and education.  A VO is created by a group of 
individuals whose members and resources may be dispersed 
geographically and/or temporally, yet who function as a 
coherent unit through the use of end-to-end cyberinfra- 
                                                        
8 (2007) i. 
9 CI Vision (2007) 32. 
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structure systems.  These CI systems provide shared access to 
centralized or distributed resources and services, often in real-
time. Such virtual organizations supporting distributed 
communities go by numerous names: collaboratory, co-
laboratory, grid community, science gateway, science portal, 
and others. 
One might be reasonably confident about the pace and scope of future 
technical advances in computing that will follow from the dynamics of 
‘Moore’s law’, the plummeting price-performance ratio of micro-
processors, and an enormous expansion of digital bandwidth and 
inexpensive memory.  But, whereas as far greater uncertainties continue 
to surround the extent to which individuals, groups, organisations, and 
institutions will be able adapt to and benefit from the novel 
technological systems that may be engineered on those foundations, 
even enthusiastic advocates of heavy investment in hardware, 
middleware and software components of the coming ubiquitously 
accessible computational facilities of a Grid-services enabled 
cyberinfrastructure, have come to recognise that there may be a 
profound gap between ‘raw’ performance capabilities (based on 
bandwidth, storage capacity, processor speed, and interconnection 
protocols), and its realised performance (based upon the ‘usability’ 
properties of the constituent system designs).  Some of that awareness 
has been heightened by recalling the disappointing findings of systematic 
evaluations of the pioneering collaboratory projects – which had been 
mounted in the US during the early 1990’s to explore the potentialities 
of the ‘virtual laboratory’ concept.10  That, however, is not the only gap 
that can significantly limit the transformational potential of ‘cyber-
infrastructure investments’.  
Achieving the aims and aspirations of e-Science and the 
Cyberinfrastructure vision is not just a matter of breakthroughs in 
hardware or software engineering, or system design improvements to 
provide tools that will be readily useable by individual researchers and 
their organisations – as challenging as those engineering tasks may be, or 
                                                        
10 See, for example, Thomas A Finholt, ‘Collaboratories as a new form of scientific 
organization’ (2003) 12 (January) Economics of Innovation and New Technology 5–25.  David and 
Spence (2003/2004: Appendix 1, and 2, below) present some information about the 
characteristics of the pioneer ‘collaboratories’.  
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even the development of programs to train researchers and teachers in 
the effective use of the new tool set.  The informal norms and formal 
rule structures for collaboration on the ground as well as in cyberspace, 
that is to say, the ‘institutional’ contexts within which the work of 
communities of scientific and technical researchers is carried on, also 
will matter profoundly.  These, too, will constrain as well as facilitate 
improvement in the effectiveness of the variety of research 
collaborations that actually are formed within and across disciplinary, 
university, and national boundaries. 
The institutional and organisational ‘environment’ of public sector e-
Science encompasses a wide and diverse array of interrelated social, 
economic and legal factors that shape the utilisation, consumption, 
governance and production of e-Science capabilities and artefacts.  
Principal amongst these are the following three: 
à the rules and regulations of the agencies that 
provide grant and contract funds to researchers 
in public research organisations;  
à the latter organisations’ own rules and 
administrative procedures governing formal 
relationships with their employed research staff 
(and research students, in the case of 
universities), which typically will refer to 
elements of the external legal system (such as the 
statutes governing contracts, liability, privacy and 
intellectual property);  
à informal epistemic community norms and 
conventions, which will be recognised if not 
always adhered to by members of the various 
scientific and technological professional 
groupings, as well as some particular ‘local social 
norms’ that are likely to emerge among 
colleagues engaged in extended research projects. 
Thus, any systematic approach to the transformation of the conduct of 
scientific and technological research hardly can avoid directing attention 
to these ‘institutional infrastructures’; their features are likely to turn out 
to be quite crucial for ensuring that the technical capabilities of advanced 
Internet computing and the Grid actually will be accessed, effectively 
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applied and exploited thoroughly by researchers organising 
collaborations in a variety of fields.  In Figure 1 (below) the foregoing 
non-technological elements are depicted, along with the middleware 
platforms and supporting layer of computer mediated communications 
hardware and software, as providing key infrastructural and regulatory 
supports of the ‘e-Science collaboration domain’.  It will be noticed that 
each the four ‘facets’ of the tetrahedron in Figure 1 makes contact with, 
and hence is both bounded and supported by three other elements of 
the ‘infrastructure’.  None of the elements exists in isolation, and hence 
in the long run it is appropriate to view all of them as endogenously.11 
In shifting the focus of attention from questions of technical engineering 
to institutional design, is it particularly important to bear in mind that 
the goals and requirements of the research organisations and host 
institutions that are likely to emerge as the eventual users of these 
facilities may well diverge significantly from those found among the 
projects which today are pioneering the development of hardware and 
software systems for e-Science.  Some forward-looking exercise of the 
imagination, therefore, is in order at this time, contemplating the 
likelihood of e-Science collaborations that will not bear close 
resemblance to the projects that currently are proceeding under that 
banner. 
To hope to avoid, or even to significantly postpone the effort of 
critically thinking through the likely needs of projects that have yet to be 
conceived of, may well prove be a costly strategy.  Very substantial 
resource costs can be entailed when societies try to utilise technological 
systems the immediate applicability of which turn out to be unexpectedly 
limited outside the immediate conditions of their genesis.  Figure 1 The 
e-Science Collaboration Domain and Its Infrastructural & Regulatory 
Supports is a concrete, pertinent and not unfamiliar illustration to 
support that proposition is available in the story of the evolution of the 
ARPANET into the Internet.12  The ARPANET and its direct 
                                                        
11 That general perspective informs the approach taken by this report, but is not explicitly 
elaborated.  For further discussion, see P A David, D Foray and J Mairesse, Public dimensions of 
the knowledge-driven economy: an analytical framework, (21 June 2001) Working Group on the 
Knowledge Economy, Center for Education Research and Innovation (CERI), OECD. 
12 This draws (briefly) on P A David, ‘The Evolving Accidental Information Super-Highway’ 
(Fall 2001) 17(2) Oxford Review of Economic Policy (Special Issue: The Economics of the Internet) 159–
87.  
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successor, the NSFNet, were communications infrastructures that had 
been developed under public auspices to serve the needs and 
circumstances of university-based research groups.  This was an 
environment of application in which individual and organisational 
behaviours generally are regulated tightly by social norms and 
institutional rules, and where the dominant ethos is that of co-operation 
in non-commercially oriented activities of inquiry and information 
dissemination.  The influence exerted over the course of three decades 
of development work (1964–1994) by the social parameters of that 
essentially stable background is reflected in the technical specifications 
of the Internet’s end-to-end architecture and the TCP/IP protocol stack.  
Rather unexpectedly, however, the rapid privatisation and 
commercialisation of the new, ‘connection-less’ communications facility 
that took place during the mid-1990s had the effect of transferring this 
technological artefact into a social environment that was very different 
from the one in which it had been designed.  The consequences have 
not been entirely unproblematic, to say the least. 
Although the Internet has now begun to be used extensively for 
commercial purposes, this new context of use is one for which the 
network of networks has been revealed to be less-than-optimally suited, 
in more than one respect.  This has given rise to an important challenges 
in areas such as: finding appropriate business models for the Internet’s 
open architecture and culture; adjusting the intellectual property rights 
(IPR) regime to the new structure of information reproduction and 
transmission costs; filtering unwanted (spam!) messages; providing 
security and protection from malicious, or simply non-co-operative, 
actions by other system users; and designing quality of service (QoS) 
suitable for network services that was never contemplated in the original 
system design.  
Early experience with the Internet and collaboration-supporting 
technologies suggests that data and other resource sharing across the 
institutional boundaries of the resulting ‘collaboratories’ – which are at 
the heart of e-Science – already is confronting legal and political 
administrative constraints, particularly those arising around intellectual 
property rights issues.  Experience in other institutional settings, such as 
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e-government, reinforces these observations.13  Finding even reasonably 
satisfactory solutions to such academic and commercial challenges 
encountered by the first generations of Internet users undoubtedly has 
created many opportunities for ingenuity to display itself, including some 
quite profitable new lines of business.  Yet, all this adaptive effort, 
whether successful or not, has entailed considerable unanticipated costs.  
The open question is whether we are now in a position to make better 
preparations to utilise the new e-Science tools that it appears to be 
within our power to fashion. 
 
Figure 1 
 
 
 
                                                        
13 For example, e-Government research underway at the University of Southern California’s 
Information Systems Institute (ISI) has focused on the development of middleware to support 
information sharing among government agencies.  Technical advances have been demonstrable, 
but entrenched political administrative traditions in US federal agencies, which are quite 
different from academia, have limited the ISI’s ability to work with data of central importance, 
such as the US Census.  
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Motivated by the foregoing contemporary developments, and informed 
by the historical experience of the Internet’s origins in the work of 
university-based scientists and engineers, this essay has a three-fold 
purpose: 
First, to articulate the nature and significance of the 
non-technological issues that will bear on the 
practical effectiveness of the hardware and software 
infrastructures that are being created to enable 
collaborations in e-Science; 
Second, to succinctly characterise the fundamental 
sources of the organisational and institutional 
challenges that need to be addressed in regard to 
defining terms, rights and responsibilities of the 
collaborating parties, and to illustrate these by 
reference to the limited experience gained to date in 
regard to intellectual property, liability, privacy, and 
security and competition policy issues affecting 
scientific research organisations;  
Third, to propose approaches for arriving at 
institutional mechanisms whose establishment would 
generate workable, specific arrangements facilitating 
collaboration in e-Science; and, that also might serve 
to meet similar needs in other spheres such as e-
Learning, e-Government, e-Commerce, e-Healthcare. 
1.2  Organisation and Overview 
The main body of this chapter is organised in four main parts.  The 
following sections of Part 1 address the first of the three principal tasks 
that have just been described, beginning with an examination of the 
technological and institutional contexts of e-Science and their 
interrelated dynamic evolution (in section 1.3), and then reviewing the 
different ways in which these two infrastructure components affect the 
costs of collaboration (in section 1.4).  
The second principal task is the subject of Part 2, which opens by 
considering the social conventions and norms that may be said to 
govern collaboration within scientific collaborative workgroups, 
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distinguishing these from the agreements governing the contractual 
relations among the institutions in which the members of those work-
group are employed.  Section 2.1 takes notice of the additional elements 
complexities that are presented by recent changes in academic 
communities’ professional norms and in the career conditions affecting 
university researchers.  Still further complications in the relationship 
between informal and formal governance mechanisms are seen to arise 
as a result of the ways in which uncodified normative structures 
governing professional conduct among collaborating individuals may be 
affected by the introduction of explicit legal contracts with their 
employing institutions, as well as with their academic peers. 
Section 2.2 takes two necessary analytical steps towards understanding 
the character of the challenges involved in finding or designing new 
concrete institutional arrangements that facilitate the formation and 
conduct of socially productive research collaborations in e-Science.  
Those challenges are rendered more formidable by the need to provide 
for multi-institutional collaborations including international partners, as 
well as to accommodate trans-disciplinary projects involving distinct 
research units (departments, laboratories, institutes or centres) within the 
same Public Research Organisation (PRO).  
The first step is to delineate (in sub-section 2.2.1) the variety of distinct 
benefits offered by co-operative organisation of research, and the 
multiple sources of conflict that are likely to exist among the interests of 
the potential collaborators, as well as among the administrative entities 
and employing institutions.  The second step (in sub-section 2.2.2) draws 
upon recent economic analysis to suggest reasons why the social 
efficiency of publicly funded research investments is likely to be greater 
under a regime of more liberal contractual arrangements among the 
individual collaborating researchers; and, particularly, under rules that 
provide ‘weak’ rather than ‘strong’ protection for the commercial 
exploitation of intellectual property rights held individually by the 
participating institutions.  From this analysis there follows an important 
meta-principle: the appropriate approaches to the institutional design 
problem for publicly funded collaborative e-Science are those that would 
be especially responsive at the margin to satisfying the collaborating 
agents’ organisational requirements for conducting the research in 
question.  Correspondingly, they will be less disposed to accommodate 
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other incompatible corporate interests and goals that their respective 
administrative units and employing institutions may seek to attain 
through participation in the proposed collaboration.    
Section 2.3 considers four classes of legal problem that might arise in the 
context of collaborative e-Science.  There has been considerable 
discussion of the impact of intellectual property rights on scientific 
collaboration. Getting the balance wrong between the ownership of, and 
access to, knowledge resources entails serious social costs that recently 
have been perceived more widely beyond the boundaries of the scientific 
community.  But, it is surprising how few people have recognised that 
intellectual property rights are only one among the many kinds of legal 
issues that need to be successfully resolved to facilitate collaborative 
work.  Collaboration among researchers can be affected by the entire 
complex of legal norms and informal professional conventions.  It is 
important that institutional arrangements are made so as to minimise the 
extent to which the law becomes an impediment to cooperation among 
researchers, whether directly, or indirectly by undermining informal 
mechanisms of trust and dispute resolution. 
Four different types of legal problem that a collaborative project might 
encounter are examined ad seriatim (by sub-sections 2.3.1 through 2.3.4, 
respectively).  These problem-classes are concerned with: 
1. the legal relationships among the parties to an e-
Science collaboration, particularly where some of the 
parties are operating in different jurisdictions; 
2. the materials that each party brings to a collaboration; 
3. the resources, if any, to which the collaborative 
project will give rise; 
4. the apportionment (among the parties) of liability for 
potential harms arising from the collaborative project. 
The third of the major tasks is taken up in Part 3.  An initial assessment 
is made (in section 3.1) of some oft-recommended legal approaches to 
simplifying institutional mechanism design problems, notably by 
introducing standard form agreements, and by harmonising disparate 
and potentially conflicting legal doctrines, and statutes.  Finding many 
practical deficiencies in the latter approaches, the argument (in section 
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3.2) favours developing an alternative, more flexible, modular process to 
generate contextually appropriate contractual arrangements for 
collaborative research projects.  The proposed process calls for the 
principal public funding bodies engaged in building the technological 
components of the e-Science infrastructure also to lead their authority to 
the work of a new ‘public actor’ in the shape of an independent advisory 
body on institutional infrastructures.  The role of that body, referred to 
as the Advisory Board on Collaboration Agreements (the ‘ABCA’) in e-
Science, would be to guide and co-ordinate the formulation and 
dissemination of an array of specific contractual clauses that could be 
used to construct a variety of legal agreements governing scientific and 
technological research collaborations among universities and other 
corporate partners.  The ABCA also could develop sufficient expertise 
to provide guidance for research groups seeking effective informal 
arrangements to deal with various internal governance issues, thereby 
facilitating the more spontaneous, ‘bottom up’ formation of projects 
enabled by the emerging e-Science collaboration tools. 
The remaining sections of Part 3 set out a number of requirements that 
should be met by the constitution of such an advisory body, in terms of 
the private expertise and public agency experience and interests upon 
which it would need to be able to draw (section 3.3), and the 
development of an evolving informational base about the actual 
collaboration arrangements and their efficacy (section 3.4).  
In the fourth and concluding Part, two different questions are treated.  
They are related, however, inasmuch as each has a concrete bearing 
upon the practical implementation of the general approach, and the 
specific recommendations advanced by Part 3.  The first of the pair 
concerns the nature of the broad principles that the proposed ABCA 
would embrace and seek to embody in a menu of contractual clauses; 
whereas the second addresses the need to find an expedient ‘way 
forward’ that would provide near-term guidance for issues of 
governance arising from the e-Science projects that are presently 
underway.   
Part 3’s procedural recommendations for ‘contractually constructing’ 
arrangements to support a variety of e-Science collaborations 
(intentionally) are formulated in a way that remains neutral with respect 
to the general thrust of the guiding principles that the ABCA would 
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embrace.  Part 4, by contrast, takes notice of the growing number of 
calls for modifications in the intellectual property rights policies of 
governments – particularly in order to assure more protection of the 
public domain in scientific and technical data and information.  Policy 
statements in that vein have emerged recently from a number of 
influential bodies in the United Kingdom, the European Union and the 
United States.  It would be remarkable were the ABCA not to give 
weight to these concerns in delineating the principles against which it 
should assess proposed model contractual clauses for use in e-Science 
collaboration agreements. 
Indeed, it is a positive advantage of the approach based upon contractual 
agreements that it would allow a direct and positive response to the 
worries expressed about excessive restraints being imposed upon open 
scientific collaboration by excessive recourse to intellectual property 
rights (IPR) protections.  In other words, there is a case (developed in 
section 4.1) for using the establishment of the ABCA as a means to 
avoid having to wait for statutory reforms in the IPR regime.  As an 
illustrative case in point, it is shown how public licensing of intellectual 
property under a standard form of ‘free and open source software’ 
(F/OSS) license–such as the GNU General Public License–may be used 
in conjunction with private contractual provisions governing commercial 
exploitation of the ‘open source’ code.  This ‘dual licensing’ approach 
can accomplish two purposes that often are presented as inimical from a 
practical standpoint.  On the one hand, public funding authorities may 
regard it as efficient to maintain the essential functional features of a 
‘knowledge commons’ in the software tools and products whose 
creation they have sponsored, but, at the same time, it may be desirable 
to leave some scope for market incentives to mobilise complementary 
private sector investment directed toward further development of basic 
software innovations released under the terms of F/OSS licenses.  
The solution suggested is to allow ‘dual licensing’ of some categories of 
publicly funded software (and middleware), combining GNU GPL 
licenses with the option of constructing contractual arrangements (built 
from standard clauses) whereby third parties obtain the copyright 
holder’s permission to develop modifications and extensions for private 
commercial distribution.  Under this approach, there would be a clearly 
identifiable need for the services of an advisory board-like entity to 
Designing Institutional Infrastructures for e-Science 
 
69
develop appropriate contractual clauses that would work in conjunction 
with copyright licenses that embody the so-called ‘copyleft’ principle.  
To initiate effective implementation of the recommended contractual 
customisation approach, and its application in the context of ‘dual 
licensing’ of F/OSS products, will require a strongly supportive stance 
on the part of the national and international public agencies and private 
foundations that provide major funding for the e-Science programs and 
projects conducted in PROs.  
The discussion of practical measures closes (in section 4.2) by outlining 
an interim course of action for the e-Science Core Program to follow, in 
order to furnish itself with expert advice and counsel for the decisions 
that must be made about non-technological governance issues affecting 
the use of the software systems whose creation it has sponsored, and 
expects to sponsor in the foreseeable future.  This ‘way forward’ could 
have a potent impact, not only in shaping the near-term institutional 
environment for e-Science in the UK, but by initiating the first steps on 
a transition path towards the eventual institutionalisation of an 
independent ABCA along the lines envisaged here.  By moving quickly 
to establish an interim Working Party on institutional infrastructures for 
e-Science, and having that body actively engage with representatives 
from international counterpart programs, the UK’s Core Program soon 
could begin exerting significant international influence.  It would thus 
move closer to fulfilling the promise of e-Science to accelerate 
advancement of knowledge and material well-being on a global scale.   
1.3 Technological and Institutional contexts of e-Science  
e-Science is a term used increasingly widely as a generic label for all 
scientific and technical research activities conducted on the Internet.14  
But it is employed more specifically here, in referring to scientific 
activities supported by high bandwidth computer-mediated 
telecommunications networks, and particularly to encompass the variety 
of such digital information-processing applications that are expected to 
be enabled by the Grid.  The latter may be viewed as the general purpose 
                                                        
14 See David and Spence (2003/2004: Appendix 1) for a glossary of descriptive terms in the 
text, including: e-Science, the Grid, Collaboratories, Virtual Laboratories, Cyberinfrastructure, 
and their relationship to one another.  
Legal Framework for e-Research: Realising the Potential 
 
70 
network technology which will serve to facilitate new, computationally 
intensive forms of scientific inquiry: desktop supercomputing, 
distributed supercomputing (a marriage of parallel and distributed 
computing), extensive exploration of linked distributed dynamic 
databases by high-speed search engines, and collaborative environments 
(collaboratories or virtual laboratories) including smart instruments for 
data capture and analysis that are coupled to supercomputing resources, 
and so on.  
 Collaborative e-Science is the aspect of the vision of 21st century science 
that holds out the most exciting new possibilities, and which also poses 
the most demanding challenges at the technical, social and legal levels.  
Technological and social changes are intertwined, and in many respects 
their interactions and mutual adaptations are difficult to disentangle.  It 
is undoubtedly the case that technological advances that have placed 
new, more productive and more costly facilities and instruments at the 
disposal of researchers are prominent among the forces driving the 
widely observed trend towards collaborative organisation of scientific 
inquiries.  But, beyond the increasing scale of projects utilising ‘lumpy’ 
capital-intensive facilities in fields such as physics and astronomy, the 
sheer increase in the amount of pertinent information, and the 
progressively more specialised knowledge and expertise that must be 
brought to bear in order to conduce fruitful research programs in most 
branches of science, have contributed to the growth in the size of teams 
and the numbers of co-authors on scientific, technical and scholarly 
publications.15  Although the continuous pressure toward specialisation 
and division of labour has pushed researchers into the forms of 
cooperative knowledge transactions entailed in collaborative inquiry, 
more recently researchers located at widely dispersed institutions have 
been drawn into informal and formal collaborations by the dramatic 
                                                        
15 Although the emergence of research collaboration in ‘Big Science’ fields was viewed from the 
1960s onwards as a significant novelty reflecting underlying tendencies in the organisational 
structure of modern science, the increasing generality of collaborative organisation is now 
attracting fresh interest as the most recent phase in a broader, longer and more continuous 
development.  See, for example, J S Katz, ‘Geographical proximity and scientific collaboration’ 
(1994) 31(1) Scientometrics  31–43; D Hicks and S J Katz, ‘Science policy for a highly 
collaborative science system’ (1996) 23(1) Science and Public Policy 39–44; J S Katz and B R 
Martin, ‘What is research collaboration?’ (1997) 26(1) Research Policy 1–18; H Etzkowitz and C 
Kemelgor, ‘The Role of Research Centres in the Collectivization of Academic Science’ (1998) 
36 Minerva 271–88.  
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advances that have been achieved in computer-mediated 
telecommunications.16  
However difficult it may be to empirically identify the separate 
influences of the technological from those of the other, social factors 
affecting collaborative research, it is not only possible but also important 
to draw this conceptual distinction.  This chapter goes further, however, 
by directing special attention to the legal-institutional contexts of the 
array of collaborative research activities that are expected to be greatly 
facilitated by improvements of the technological components of the e-
Science infrastructure.  As a background for the discussion, a taxonomic 
framework for e-Science collaborations has been developed that 
highlights the various classes of interactions among collaborating parties 
that these technical facilities can support.  This framework classifies 
collaborations on the basis of their major purpose, rather by reference to 
the particular digital information tools and services they might employ.  
Our taxonomy distinguishes among virtual laboratory activities 
conducted via the (enhanced) Internet that are pre-dominantly: 
1. ‘community-centric’ – aiming to bring researchers 
together either for synchronous or asynchronous 
information exchanges; 
2. ‘data-centric’ – providing accessible stores of data 
captured or extracted from remote sources, and 
creating new information by editing and annotating 
them; 
3. ‘computation-centric’ –providing high-performance 
computing capabilities either by means of servers 
accessing super-computers and parallel computing 
clusters, or making possible for the collaborators to 
                                                        
16 See David and Spence (2003/2004: Appendix 1, Figures 1–3).  This is reflected in the rising 
frequency of inter-institutional collaborative publications among US university researchers in 
scientific domains where average team size is comparatively small (for example, mathematics, 
and economics); and also by the observation that the growth of inter-institutional collaborative 
publications involving US academic researchers in international teams has outpaced that of 
purely domestic inter-institutional collaborative publications, as well as the rate of growth in 
average team sizes.  See James D Adams et al, Patterns of Research Collaboration in U.S. Universities, 
1981–1999, (March 2002) Economics Department Working Paper, University of Florida.  
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organise peer-to-peer sharing of distributed 
computation capacity; 
4. ‘interaction-centric – enabling applications that 
involve real-time interactions among two or more 
participants, for decision-making, visualisation or 
continuous control of instruments.  
When this scheme is applied to classify the array of Pilot Projects that 
have been funded under the e-Science Core Programme in the United 
Kingdom, the data-centric branch of the taxonomic tree emerges as far 
and away the most densely populated.17  The situation contrasts with the 
more uniform distribution that emerges from a comparable classification 
of much small number of pioneer collaboratory projects that were 
organised under public funding programs in the US during the late 
1980’s and early 1990’s.18  That difference reflects in part the focus of 
the e-Science program on the creation of middle-ware platforms and 
tools, and in part the greater centrality of the roles that digital databases 
have more recent come to occupy in the work of science and 
engineering communities.  Yet, a suspicion remains that some influence 
on the profile of these the Pilot Project sample also has been exerted by 
consideration of the greater administrative complexities that would have 
to be overcome to organise more thoroughly interactive modes of 
collaboration among research groups situated at various institutions 
within the UK.  
The institutional infrastructure for e-Science collaborations might be 
viewed by some to be the soft part of what the report of the recent NSF 
Blue Ribbon Advisory Panel19 refers to as the ‘Cyberinfrastructure’ that 
promises to revolutionise science and engineering.20  But, in truth, its 
design, construction, maintenance and updating pose many challenges 
                                                        
17 Another use of the taxonomy has been to assist in identifying a subset among the Pilot 
Projects that contained representatives of each of the ‘collaboration purposes’, and whose 
activities could be studied more closely in order to understand the variety of e-Science research 
contexts for which supportive institutional arrangements would need to be constructed.  
18 See David and Spence (2003/2004: Appendix 1, Figure 4).  
19 (February 2003). 
20 See Atkins et al, Revolutionizing science and engineering through cyberinfrastructure (2003) 
<http://www.communitytechnology.org/nsf_ci_report/>. 
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that are at once more delicate and harder than the technical engineering 
feats required for reliable and secure Grid-enabled computing.  
Institutions simultaneously are run by and govern human agents, and, 
for that reason as well as others, they are considerably less plastic than 
most machine organisations – i.e., systems composed of technological 
artefacts.  Often, when they function well, institutions and the 
behavioural norms they reinforce become unobtrusive and tend to 
disappear into the background, so that the question of whether they will 
require modification to continue functioning smoothly in new 
environments is often deferred until after those environments have 
materialised.  
Scientific teams engaged in hardware and software engineering in order 
to forge the tools needed to support their own work are, as a rule, more 
than fully tasked.  They seldom are able to focus concurrently on the 
issues of how social and technological mechanisms can best be 
combined to address the array of complex problems that other users of 
those tools eventually would need to solve before the potentialities e-
Science can be fully realised.  Nor should working scientists be expected 
to possess the necessary expertise to consider the problems of 
developing procedural norms and formal contractual arrangements 
governing collaborative contributions of research resources.21 
1.4 Towards Envisaging the Cyberinfrastructure with 
Collaboration Costs 
The functional domain of institutional arrangements supporting 
scientific collaboration is both extensive and complex.  These 
arrangements will govern the terms of access to and control over 
instruments and other physical facilities, and the data-streams generated 
in the research process.  They will, in effect, apportion the scientific 
recognition and the disposition of ownership rights in collective work 
products created in cyberspace.  They must also assign responsibilities 
for errors of commission and omission in those research outcomes, as 
                                                        
21 Lest there be any doubt on this score, it should be emphasised that the limited attention 
accorded to institutional design by scientists and technologists is a consequence of 
specialisation, and therefore the comment here is not meant as a reproach.  As Bertrand Russell 
said, ‘We forgive specialists, because they do good work.’ 
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well as liabilities for damages and legal infractions of various kinds 
arising from the actions of participants in the joint activities. 
Generic collaborative arrangements of these kinds involve issues whose 
solutions naturally may appear quite familiar, and altogether tractable in 
the context of a co-located research team.  Yet, the same issues quickly 
can become dauntingly complex when collaboration is extended to a 
multiplicity of geographically distributed teams and physical facilities, 
each of whose members have contractual relationships as employees of, 
or consultants to one or another among several different corporate 
entities.  The latter, moreover, may well mix both public and private 
sector institutions and organisations all of which are not situated within 
and hence under the governance of a single legal jurisdiction and 
political authority.  
It is evident that the complex collaborative undertakings in view here – 
those that are meant to be enabled, indeed, empowered by e-Science 
facilities and services – cannot be supposed to arise and function 
automatically as ‘perfect teams’ expressing some primitive cooperative 
impulse among the human actors.  Quite the contrary: the collaborators 
will need to find solutions for non-technological issues of resource 
allocation and governance that involve conflicts arising from the 
divergent interests of the individuals and organisations involved.  
Moreover, to sustain extended programs of research that continue to 
build upon and utilise the specialised knowledge that they generate, 
those solutions must be sufficiently flexible to accommodate the high 
order of uncertainty that inevitably surrounds research activities.  That is 
especially so for fundamental, exploratory research programs of the sort 
for which public support is particularly warranted.  Only the satisfactory 
resolution of those conflicts will permit realisation of the gains from 
cooperation.  Yet, it is important not to lose sight of the reality that 
‘conflict resolution’ is not a costless process.  Consequently, the means 
by which such solutions are arrived at ought not impose heavy 
‘transactions costs’ upon the parties, thereby draining resources from the 
conduct of research itself, or, worse still, undermining whatever 
cooperative spirit and ethos of common purpose initially animated the 
collaborative enterprise. 
The lattermost of these requirements may be seen to be present in the 
very idea of an e-Science ‘infrastructure’ as that is now coming to be 
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conceptualised.  The recent report of the NSF Blue Ribbon Advisory 
Panel on Cyberinfrastructure22 describes the latter concept in expansive 
terms, in which the activities of human agents and organisations also are 
subsumed under the heading of infrastructure.  According to the Panel,23 
whereas, historically ‘infrastructure’ has been viewed by people in the 
computer and telecommunication engineering sciences ‘largely as raw 
resources like compute cycles or communication bandwidth,’ now it is 
critical to think of [cyber-] ‘infrastructure’ as having three rather 
different basic components: 
à Technological artefacts.  These human-constructed 
artefacts include facilities (computers, mass storage, 
networks, etc) and software.  These artefacts 
sometimes provide services, and sometimes they are 
simply available to be ‘designed into’ applications. 
à Technological services.  Various capabilities are 
provided as services available over the network rather 
than as software artefacts to be deployed and 
operated locally to the end-user. 
à Services from people and organisations.  These 
include everybody who is providing a shared pool of 
expertise leveraged by the entire scientific and 
engineering research community to develop and 
operate the technological artefacts and provide advice 
and assistance to end-users making use of them.’ 
Given the inclusion of the lattermost among these, it is rather 
remarkable that nothing in the report of this NSF Panel addresses the 
nature of the institutional settings, the incentive mechanisms, and the 
organisational culture of those who are ‘providing a shared pool of 
expertise leveraged by the entire scientific and engineering research 
community.’  Remarkable as that omission is when viewed from a 
systems design perspective, perhaps it is readily understandable as a 
rhetorical strategy: to focus upon the difficult and all too familiar 
questions posed by the human organisation components of the system 
                                                        
22 (2003) A-1–2. 
23 (2003) A-3. 
Legal Framework for e-Research: Realising the Potential 
 
76 
undoubtedly takes something away from the construction of a 
persuasively enthusiastic case for devoting a very substantial amount of 
funding to its technological elements.  The principal problem with this, 
however, is that to say ‘well, we can always jump off that bridge when 
we come to it’, and then to hasten onwards, is more often than not a 
self-fulfilling strategy.  
2. THE INSTITUTIONAL CONTEXT OF SCIENTIFIC 
COLLABORATION 
This chapter makes recommendations about how appropriate 
institutional arrangements, and legal contractual arrangements in 
particular, might be established for collaborative e-Science.  But, in 
constructing and seeking to implement such arrangements it is important 
to understand both the informal institutional conditions under which 
collaborative scientific research projects are organised and conducted, 
and the specific character of the legal issues that will arise in the 
organisation of e-Science projects.  A few, key aspects of the 
institutional settings in which arrangements for collaborative e-Science 
projects are required can have a major effect in determining the success 
of such undertakings.  As these have strong implications for the 
approach that underlies the recommendations put forward in Part 3, it is 
important to lay a basis for the latter by reviewing these features of the 
current ‘institutional environment’. 
2.1  Complexities of the Current Institutional Environment 
A first and quite important point to notice about academic communities 
today is that they have been undergoing rapid changes that have left the 
norms of professional behaviour far from uniform, and in a state of flux.  
In particular, the scientific communities traditionally had similar (albeit 
differentiated) norms for the attribution of credit and responsibility for 
collaborative research.  These traditional norms fostered the 
dissemination of scientific information because the primary incentive for 
individual researchers (status and recognition within the scientific 
community), constituted incentive for them to disseminate widely and to 
accept responsibility for research results.24  A relatively secure career 
                                                        
24 For an account of the classic sociological treatment of the norms of academic science 
communities, and the modern economic analysis in information-theoretic terms of the 
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structure also meant that researchers had little incentive to distort or to 
falsify results because the risk to reputation outweighed potential short-
run gains.  Yet, the increasing uncertainty of scientific careers has led to 
more disputes about the attribution of credit and responsibility for 
research findings.  Major journals such as the Journal of the American 
Medical Association and organisations such as the International Committee of 
Medical Journal Editors now have explicit policies regarding the attribution 
of authorship and responsibility in contexts of collaborative work. 
Additionally, universities and other public research organisations (PROs) 
have responded to government policies urging them to cooperate with 
business firms sponsoring university-based R&D projects, as well as to 
make efforts of their own to capture value from academic research 
results.  The resulting pursuit of intellectual property rights, and their 
exploitation through licensing or the creation of university-owned ‘start-
up’ enterprises, has worked to undercut the traditional incentives to 
rapidly and fully disseminate research findings and methods.25  This 
weakening of traditional ‘open science’ incentives to claim priority of 
discovery (rather than securing property rights) has been accompanied in 
some quarters by the erosion of older normative structures.  There is 
considerable heterogeneity of belief among some communities, most 
evident among the life sciences, as to whether or not the prime 
obligation of academic scientists remains co-operation for the 
advancement of knowledge, or the pursuit of research geared toward 
                                                                                                                  
functioning of the resulting behavioural incentives and constraints, see P Dasgupta and P A 
David, ‘Towards a New Economics of Science’ (1994) 23 (1–2) Research Policy  487–521; also, P 
A David, ‘The Economic Logic of ‘Open Science’ and the Balance between Private Property 
Rights and the Public Domain in Scientific Data and Information: A Primer’ forthcoming in 
National Research Council, The Role of the Public Domain in Scientific Data and Information, (2003) 
Washington, DC: National Academy Press (SIEPR Policy paper No 02–030, Stanford 
University, March 2003 <http://siepr.stanford.edu/papers/pdf/02–30.html>). 
25 Typically, this has involved a focus on licensing the use of trade-marks and logos, and 
university-owned patents, copyrights (and more lately database rights), as well as arrangements 
assigning patents to start-up ventures in which the university takes an equity position.  But, 
more recently British universities are being encouraged by Government funding and policy 
initiatives to develop a wider array of so-called ‘Third Stream’ activities – i.e., those involving 
the commercial provision of knowledge products and services (other than teaching and 
research within their individual institutional purview).  Moreover, in some Government circles 
it is viewed as not only appropriate but imperative that universities have long-term strategies 
for developing and managing their ‘knowledge assets’ so as be better able to engage in ‘Third 
Stream’ revenue generating activities.  See Jordi Molas-Galant et al, Measuring Third Stream 
Activities: A Report to the Russell Group of Universities (April 2002) SPRU, University of Sussex. 
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profitable commercial innovations – including those from which they 
can expect to benefit personally.26  
These new trends have not, however, been advancing with uniform 
strength across all areas of scientific endeavour, institutions or 
geographical regions.  They are, for example, quite evidently far more 
pronounced in the life sciences, and particularly so among departments 
engaged in molecular biology and genetics than among departments of 
theoretical and experimental particle physics.  The uncertainty this 
creates would appear to imply that formal legal rules allocating 
responsibility for, and the outcomes of, collaborative projects are more 
important now than ever.  Certainly academic researchers are 
increasingly aware that the law has the power to impinge upon their 
work, and many are sensitive to the existence of a disjuncture between 
the norms upon which the law operates and those that have traditionally 
governed collaborative science. 
2.1.1 The Balance between Informal and Formal Governance Mechanisms  
Individual scientists, however, have varying degrees of commitment to 
the traditional norms and in any case lack an obvious forum in which to 
express dissatisfaction with the law.  Moreover, they differ in their 
interest and talent for handling the administrative aspects of scientific 
projects.  Such differences notwithstanding, most working scientists tend 
to express impatience with, if not disdain for the effort to formal rules, 
norms and standards of individual conduct among researchers – even if 
they acknowledge that this may be necessary to create an appropriate 
institutional context for the conduct of a new collaborative undertaking.  
These attitudes reflect in some part the shared expectation that 
relationships among scientific peers and co-workers can be governed by 
the incentive compatibility of co-operative consultative processes (where 
                                                        
26 See, for example, Jason Owen-Smith and Walter W Powell, ‘Careers and Contradictions: 
Faculty Responses to the Transformation of Knowledge and its Uses in the Life Sciences’ 
(2001) 10 Research in the Sociology of Work (Special Issue on The Transformation of Work, edited by 
Steven Vallas) 109–40; Rebecca S Eisenberg, ‘Bargaining over the transfer of proprietary 
research tools: Is this market failing or emerging’ in R Dreyfuss, D L Zimmerman and H First 
(eds) Expanding the Boundaries of Intellectual Property (2001); J P Walsh, A Arora and W M Cohen, 
‘Research Tool Patenting and Licensing and Biomedical Innovation, (December 2002) in The 
Operation and Effects of the Patent System, (Report of the STEP Board of the National Research 
Council, National Academy of Sciences), forthcoming from National Academy Press in 2003. 
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the important games are strongly ‘positive sum,’ and there will be a 
potential for significant damage to individual’s reputation if they are seen 
to have defected from cooperative play).  Impatience with efforts to 
articulate norms also may stem, in some part, from the supposition that 
the asymmetry of power relationships within scientific workgroups is 
well recognised by all the participants; and is understood by them to 
provide a reasonable enforcement mechanism to resolve the normal run 
of internal disagreements – for example, by appeal to the authority of 
the project director.  Nevertheless, the introduction of new actors (either 
in the form of another, collaborating workgroups, or administrative 
representatives of host institutions) readily can de-stabilise those internal 
governance mechanisms. 
Proposals for new collaborative arrangements, however, introduce the 
possibility of new incentive structures, which also may be inherently de-
stabilising.  Excessive interest in the details of the administrative 
arrangements might not only be considered a diversion from the core 
scientific activity, but a threat to the trust upon which scientific 
collaboration depends.  It is important for the success of a collaborative 
project that the scientists involved understand the broad terms upon 
which it is to be conducted.  At the same time, exposure to a lawyer’s 
attempt to anticipate all the conceivable potential situations leading to 
collaborative failure or other unwanted outcomes, and to provide for 
remedies and mitigating procedures ex-ante, may negatively impact the 
collaborative spirit of the research partners.  
Thus, while it surely is salutary to clarify ambiguous social norms, and to 
reinforce certain professional standards of conduct in situations where 
these are found to have undergone unwanted erosion, it could be quite 
counterproductive to attempt to devise and complete detailed contract-
like regulations for the internal governance of relations among academic 
researchers.  Such ‘codes’ may have the perverse effect of inducing 
researchers to think narrowly in terms of legal rights and obligations, and 
to resort to the often cumbersome machinery of the law in order to 
resolve disputes among colleagues, or conflicts with university 
administrators.  For example, in the face of unforeseen contingencies, 
participants in a collaborative project may stand by the letter of the 
contract rather than co-operate towards averting escalation of the 
conflict into an organisational crisis.  Equally, conscious of having the 
option of recourse to legal means of protecting their interests, they may 
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be less concerned to look for ways to remove the source of the problem 
– say, by rearranging features of the project’s work programme.  Explicit 
preparations to deal with ‘collaboration failure’ by mobilising external 
(legal) resources, can in this way ‘crowd out’ individuals’ voluntary 
actions that would render the collective effort more successful.  
Researchers who feel that no or little trust is placed in them may be 
more likely to behave in ways that are inimical to the success of the 
collaboration.27  Evidence from experimental economics and field 
studies shows that the introduction of explicit contractual incentives can 
weaken or entirely vitiate the effects whatever intrinsic impulses or social 
motivations might otherwise be sufficient to elicit cooperative behaviour 
on the part of the actors.28 
The same principle also has a bearing upon the approach to inter-
institutional contracting where legal agreements are required.  In 
designing an institutional framework for e-Science collaboratories, a light 
touch approach may be required to prevent all remnants of the ‘open 
science’ ethos from being ‘crowded out’ even from the transactions 
among academic institutions.29  Certainly, when considering the 
respective roles played by formal contractual agreements and informal 
norms and understandings regulating the interactions among members 
of research communities, one should not suppose that these are 
perfectly complementary, or even strictly ‘additive’.  At the margin, each 
                                                        
27 See, for example, M Bacharach, G Guerra and D J Zizzo, Is Trust Self-Fulfilling? An 
Experimental Study (2001) Oxford University Department of Economics Discussion Paper No 
76 <http://www.econ.ox.ac.uk/Research/WP/PDF/paper076.pdf>, and G Guerra and D J 
Zizzo, ‘Trust Responsiveness and Beliefs’ (2003) Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization - 
the Discussion paper version available at 
<http://www.econ.ox.ac.uk/Research/WP/PDF/paper099.pdf> (in press, forthcoming in 
2003). 
28 See, for example, S S Frey and R Jegen, ‘Motivational Interactions: Effects on Behavior’ 
(2001) 63–64 Annales d’Economie et de Statistique 131–53; U Gneezy and A Rustichini, ‘Pay 
Enough or Don’t Pay at All’ (2000) 115 Quarterly Journal of Economics 791–810; and E L Deci, R 
Koestner and R M Ryan, ‘A Meta-Analytic Review of Experiments Examining the Effects of 
Extrinsic Rewards on Intrinsic Motivation’ (1999) 125 Psychological Bulletin 627–68.  For 
directing US to this pertinent literature, the writers are indebted to Daniel Zizzo, of Christ 
Church College, Oxford.  
29 Further research undoubtedly would be required to assess how light this ‘light touch’ would 
have to be in various situation, in order to minimise the displacement of informal 
understandings in contexts where those are more supportive of fruitful on-going inter-
institutional co-operation.   
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may provide a substitute for the other.  The problem is that one rarely 
can know, a priori, how deep that margin is, and whether the 
introduction of a requirement to enter into formal legal contracts may in 
effect displace, or degrade the effectiveness of informal governance 
mechanisms.  This is an observation that can be formulated in rather 
general terms, and, indeed, economic analysts frequently made the point 
that external regulatory provisions mandated by government may ‘crowd 
out’ the provision of less formal governance arrangements among the 
agents involved.30  
The implications of the foregoing are quite straight-forward.  Firstly, the 
parties seeking to establish a mutually beneficial collaborative research 
project have both incentives and capabilities to start the process on their 
own, in a ‘bottom up’ fashion.  Beginning without anything like a 
complete and explicit set of governance arrangements provided by legal 
contracts (which would carry external ‘third party’, enforcement 
provisions), they undoubtedly will quickly enter into some informal 
discussions on key issues: the division of research responsibilities, the 
arrangements for access to data-streams while the research is in progress, 
and afterwards; also high on the agenda for discussion will be the 
project’s publication plans, and the general ‘collective policy’ vis-à-vis 
intellectual property rights claims to such results as may be anticipated.31 
                                                        
30 A very simple illustration of this very general point arises in discussions of the ‘moral hazard’ 
problem that is alleged to have been created by government programs that insured depositors 
in mutual savings banks in the US; lulled to a sense of security that they would be protected 
from losses due to the bank’s inability to pay, the depositor-shareholders paid little attention, 
and so left unchecked the unsound loans and fraudulent transactions that were made by the 
executives who managed the affairs of many of those federally chartered institutions.  A rather 
more subtle point to notice is that the introduction of formal prescriptive arrangements 
governing behaviour – such as contracts – in circumstances where there is uncertainty, and 
consequently less than complete information, means that such contracts necessary will be 
incomplete.  At best, they can specify ex ante features of the process, or procedure that the 
parties are to follow in coping with unanticipated events affecting their enterprise.  
31 See, for example, S Hilgartner and S I Brandt-Rauf, ‘Data Access, Ownership and Control: 
Toward Empirical Studies of Access Practices’ (1994) 15 Knowledge 355–72; S Hilgartner, 
‘Access to Data and Intellectual Property: Scientific Exchange in Genome Research’ (1997) 
Intellectual Property Rights and the Dissemination of Research Tools in Molecular Biology 28–9 (summary 
of a Workshop held at the National Academy of Science, Washington DC, 15–16 February 
1996); S Hilgartner, ‘Data Access Policy in Genome Research,’ in A Thackray (ed), Private Science 
(1998), on the arrangements for access and control of data-streams that emerged among the 
teams participating in the Human Genome Project.  These internal data-sharing agreements 
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Secondly, there is reason to expect that there will be latent or manifest 
grounds for members of such groups to devote time and effort to 
activities that are likely to reinforce cooperative attitudes and behaviours 
among the participants.  Those efforts include an array of ‘natural’ social 
contacts (dyadic transactions as well as collective assemblies) which 
facilitate monitoring of the personal dispositions and social attitudes of 
colleagues, and can contribute to raising levels of trust and 
trustworthiness.  To engage in non-committal speculative discussions 
that explore the possibilities of successive projects of potential mutual 
benefit, the formation of which would be contingent on the successful 
outcome of the immediate prospective collaboration, would have a 
similar function.  They serve to embed what otherwise might be 
construed as a ‘one-time transaction’ in a ‘super-game’ that features 
repeated play.  The pay-off structure of the latter form of game tends to 
induce (rational) participants to defer defections from co-operation, 
even if it remains unwarranted to assume that acts of self-interested 
opportunism at the expense of the rest of the group will therefore have 
been foresworn by every one of the players.  
Therefore, it is not unreasonable for scientists to be disposed to avoid, 
to the utmost extent possible, both efforts to codify administrative rules 
for research management, and the framing of legal contracts for 
governance of collaborative projects.  In addition to the analytical 
considerations already reviewed, there is empirical experience in the field 
of contract law that even in business affairs many parties are reluctant to 
use the law in the planning of their relationships, because they fear that 
it will harm the collaborative nature of purely commercial relationships. 
The upshot is that the desire of scientists not to become embroiled in 
such administrative and legal matters ought to be respected in 
determining appropriate governance structures for collaborative 
projects, even when these require the provision of legal contracts.  From 
this position it follows that what scientists would find most helpful in 
pursuing research by means of multi-party collaborations is a menu from 
which to select ‘ready-made’ solutions to the more commonly occurring 
specific problems in such enterprises; and the option to reconfigure the 
                                                                                                                  
may be contrasted with the observations of the weakening in recent years of the ethos of 
general data-sharing in the biomedical sciences (noted above, in section 2.1).   
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elements of those solutions to fit the idiosyncratic requirements of their 
particular circumstances. 
The indicated solutions can be of two sorts.  For intra-project 
relationships among employees of a given administrative unit (which 
includes an entire hierarchically administered institution such as a 
research institute or a university), the menu should emphasise reliance 
upon informal, peer-enforced norms of conduct, and alternative 
procedures for dispute resolution.  But, the governance arrangements 
pertaining to research relationships that involve collaborations across 
institutional boundaries, whether with other PROs or with business 
firms, will require legal contracts; the menu of alternative contractual 
clauses in that case must feature the array of provisions from which a 
comprehensive agreement can be constructed.  
2.1.2 Conflicting Interests in Institutional Collaborations and Partnerships 
The principal legal actors in the establishment of a collaborative research 
project generally are not the researchers involved, but, as has been 
noted, the institutions by which they are employed.  This is both 
appropriate and presents real dangers.  On the one hand, it is 
appropriate that scientists should be relieved of the burden of 
establishing and maintaining the infrastructures of collaborative work.  
On the other hand, there is a danger that the farther the creation and 
maintenance of such structures is placed from the activities of 
collaborative science itself, the greater is the likelihood that those 
structures will reflect the interests of actors other than the collaborating 
scientists, and worse, actors whose goals may be inimical to the effective 
conduct of the project. 
Universities do have multiple and conflicting institutional interests in 
relation to collaborative scientific research.  They may find it in their 
interest to foster collaborative science as a means of supplementing their 
intellectual capabilities, enhancing the institutional research reputation of 
their schools and departments, and attracting ‘star’ researchers and 
research funding – both in the near term and in the longer run.  In some 
areas, such as the European Union Framework Programmes, contractual 
participation in multi-institutional networks is the sine qua non for 
obtaining external funding, and, increasingly in recent years public 
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research agencies and private foundations have encouraged the 
organising of collaborative projects of that kind.32  
At the same time, however, universities also have acquired a stake in the 
promotion of some government policies that may well turn out to 
impede collaborative research in science and technology.  Universities in 
the United Kingdom, for example, have adopted increasingly 
comprehensive policies of asserting ownership of any intellectual 
property in material produced by their research and teaching staffs.  In 
some instances it is true that clear policies regarding the ownership of 
intellectual property may facilitate the resolution of disputes between 
collaborators.  In other circumstances, however, the potential conflicts 
of the IPR claims asserted by the different institutions that employ the 
would-be collaborators (i.e., the research scientists) can create 
impediments to the formation of scientifically promising projects.  
Indeed, the prospective transactions costs incurred in trying to resolve 
what are in essence distributive conflicts among the prospective 
participants may even frustrate formation of research undertakings that 
are likely to yield high rates of return to the coalition as a whole. 
Universities are particularly complex organisations, however, and their 
key administrative leaders typically are well aware of the multiplicity of 
distinct missions that society expects them to pursue concurrently, so 
that the balance of priorities among those missions often is less than 
clearly defined within each institution.33  In some respects this degree of 
                                                        
32 For discussion and analysis of endogenous coalition formation in response to such programs, 
see P A David and L C Keely, ‘The Economics of Scientific Research Coalitions: Collaborative 
Network Formation in the Presence of Multiple Funding Agencies’ in A Geuna, A Salter and 
W E Steinmueller (eds), Science and Innovation: Rethinking the Rationales for Funding and Governance 
(2003). 
33 In Britain, the Russell Group of Universities has recognised this in a recent expression of 
concern that Government core funding for universities might be associated with easy-to-
measure features of entrepreneurship, technology transfer, commercial knowledge service 
provision, and still other so-called ‘Third Stream’ activities – at the expense of the many other 
forms of interaction between universities and the economy.  ‘This concern is particularly acute 
‘among leading traditional universities that value the close integration of teaching and research, 
that operate across all the disciplines, and that engage with society in very many diverse ways 
that include, but are not limited to economic transactions. Some are undertaken to achieve a 
directly financial outcome, while most are promoted for their wider, out-reach and often long-
term benefits. Furthermore, there is a broad spread of missions within the British University 
sector.’  See: <http://www.clo.cam.ac.uk/3rd_arm_metrics.htm>.  It is a sign of the times that 
the statement of the Russell Group, rather than focusing concern upon the possible sacrifice of 
the universities’ creditability and capacity in a wider set of non-commercial social interactions, 
Designing Institutional Infrastructures for e-Science 
 
85
ambiguity is a source of flexibility and accommodation to special 
circumstances, but it also may permit formal contractual arrangements 
for co-operative research among them to becoming ‘snagged’ on points 
of importance to one or another of the participants – even when those 
matters have little to do with distributive conflicts, and consequently are 
difficult to resolve by arranging inter-institutional ‘side-payments’.  
Quite understandably, legal departments operating within universities 
must maintain a strong professional commitment to protecting the 
institution by limiting its exposure to the particular risks of 
collaboration, as well to the losses that may ensue from the conduct of 
research by their own employees and contractors.  Sometimes, therefore, 
foreseeable and uninsurable risks the individual institutions would have 
to bear will appear too large in comparison to the uncertain benefits they 
might derive, and so it will turn out to be far easier to negotiate ‘safer’ 
collaborative projects, or ones with more readily calculable future 
income-streams.  Furthermore, in response to the thrust of recent 
government policies promoting the search by universities for income 
from the commercialisation of their so-called ‘knowledge assets’, the 
efforts of technology transfer offices and intellectual property 
management organisations are directed towards fixing the terms of 
collaborative research projects so as to augment the flow of income to 
their respective institutions.  Of course, this pits each against the similar 
interests of the other collaborating institutions, and likewise against the 
business companies whose participation (and sponsorship) is predicated 
on obtaining a satisfactorily large share of the prospective economic 
returns. 
One should not underestimate the seriousness of the difficulties that 
have thus been created for university officers who are given 
responsibilities for negotiating true inter-university agreements that have 
to resolve conflicts over the division of prospective proceeds from the 
commercial exploitation of research findings.  The same conditions also 
may give rise to tensions between groups of academic researchers who 
are keen to participate in a particular collaborative project and their 
                                                                                                                  
focuses on the need for methodologies to allocate government support for the diverse array of 
‘Third Stream’ activities in which they typically engage, and therefore to protect there 
institutions position in the face of potential competition from more specialised claimants for 
‘Third Stream’ support.  
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respective university legal counsels, who are equally intent upon limiting 
(as far as is possible) their own institution’s exposure to liability and 
other legal risks, as well as asserting its claim to the largest possible flow 
of material benefits that the project might yield.  The immediately 
perceived interests of the university as a legal corporate entity may 
involve asserting provisions that do not necessarily advance the interests 
of the researchers, and indeed would be enforced at their expense.  A 
more subtle effect that, as has been noticed, can have a corrosive effect 
on the trust necessary for successful research collaboration, is the well-
intentioned effort of a diligent lawyer to render explicit ex ante all the 
things that conceivably could go wrong, and all the forms that betrayal 
of trust that the collaboration might sustain.  
Decision-making becomes particularly complex when the interests of the 
parties diverge (let alone conflict) and no one set of specialised actors 
understands all the issues and is in a position to balance the potential 
risks of going forward with the collaboration as it has been designed by 
the researchers, against the risks of losing the prospective benefits by 
imposing a different set of arrangements that would frustrate the 
research itself, or weaken the incentives of the participants to behave co-
operatively.  Numerous examples might be cited in this regard, but a 
familiar comparatively benign illustration of the general problem may be 
seen in the situation of the specialised service offices that most research 
universities have found it necessary to establish in order to facilitate the 
transactions with external sponsors of research. 
Typically, the ‘sponsored research office’ in a US academic institution 
(and its counterpart, the ‘university research services’ office in Britain), 
develops familiarity and expertise in regard to the panoply of regulations 
and requirements that funding bodies impose upon applicants, and 
recipients of awards; and equally specialised skills in anticipating the 
issues that will arise in negotiations with corporate research partners.  
The performance of theses organisations is likely to be gauged primarily 
in terms of the volume of funding that their respective institutions 
receive from public (including charitable foundation) grants and 
contracts, and also from research partnership agreements concluded 
with business firms – not the satisfaction of the researchers, or the 
scientific and scholarly productivity of their sponsored research projects.  
University research services officers often have qualifications and 
practical professional experience in the law, but their role is quite distinct 
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and in a sense more demanding than that of university legal counsel per 
se.  They are thus able to provide intermediation services that greatly 
reduce the burden of ‘negotiation and administration’ upon the 
researchers.  But, with expertise and the quest for efficiency comes a 
tendency on the part of such offices to promote compliance with 
standardised contractual formulae, to avoid undertaking to provide 
novel or highly ‘customised solutions’ that may better fit the needs of a 
particular research project.  The main institutional problem posed by 
such solutions is that they are unfamiliar, and hence all too likely to 
occasion time - and attention - consuming special negotiations with 
other departments within their own university, as well as with the 
external agencies.34  
As a specialised intermediary the sponsored projects office is thus pre-
disposed by its own incentive structure to implement, rather than to 
question the need for contractual provisions that are asked for by 
diligent university solicitors – functioning in their specialised domain to 
protect the institution from the entire array of harms to which it may be 
exposed by a proposed research agreement.  Thus, it is the extraordinary 
‘university research services office’ that can be expected to take upon 
itself the role of serving university researchers as an ‘agent’ serves a 
‘principal,’ and a professional firm of lawyers serves it clients.  At the 
same time, although it occupies the intermediary position upon which 
converge the varieties of diverse and possibly divergent interests within 
the university in regard to particular proposals for collaborative research, 
these service organisations have not been given explicit discretionary 
authority to strike a balance among those contenting interests.  
For the individual researchers who have initiated a collaborative 
proposal, matters are made more complicated and potentially more 
difficult by the fact that the principal contracting parties, legally 
speaking, will not be their other scientific colleagues but, instead, those 
colleagues’ respective institutional employers.  This really is a two-sided 
problem, because the success of most collaborative projects will depend 
upon the work of individual researchers and research administrators 
                                                        
34 In the latter context, it is quite possible that the presentation of unusual (anomalous) contract 
proposals may be read by their counterparts outside the university as a symptomatic of 
deficient professional competence, or lack of authority within the institution they serve; 
whereas, just the opposite interpretation would be more forthcoming were they perceived to be 
acting on behalf of a legal client – in this case the researchers, or their university.  
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with scientific expertise.  The peculiar employment structure of 
academic institutions, with their tradition of academic freedom, and the 
increasing mobility of scientific researchers, means that the contracting 
university often has little control over its ability to deliver the services 
that it promises in the contract to establish a research project.  It may 
well be that if the incentives of universities to enter collaborations are 
further increased in the future, there will be corresponding efforts to 
alter the contractual relations with their employees so as to more closely 
emulate business corporations – particularly in respect to the power of 
the latter to direct and control the participation of employed researchers 
in designated co-operative projects involving other organisational 
entities. 
 While there will be obvious practical difficulties in pursuing such a 
restructuring of university employment relations, it is not evident today 
that the idea of would be rejected quickly, either as inappropriate or as 
difficult to reconcile with the ethos of scholarly autonomy.  Increasingly, 
universities in the United Kingdom and elsewhere are coming to regard 
their members (faculty and student members alike) as ‘knowledge assets’.  
The very term suggests that those responsible for the disposition of 
university assets should be able to exercise more complete and exclusive 
control over faculty members’ activities, so as to better deploy them in 
pursuit of greater revenues from the intellectual property and 
commercially valuable ‘knowledge services’ they are able to generate.  In 
most cases there is little likelihood that the incremental revenue streams 
thereby captured from the intellectual property arising through the 
assigned work of employees and students will materially alter the 
institution’s financial situation.35  Yet, as economists are quick to point 
out, resource allocation decisions are determined ‘at the margin’.  
Consequently, it is quite frequently observed that the prospect of the 
university achieving a comparatively small financial benefit will elicit the 
expenditure of significant administrative effort in altering long-
established policies and operating rules.  Likewise, the prospect of the 
university being exposed to a low-probability and low-cost risk, or of 
                                                        
35 See David R Mowery et al, ‘The Growth of Patenting and Licensing by U. S. Universities: An 
Assessment of the Effects of the Bayh-Dole Act of 1980’ (2001) 30 Research Policy; Richard 
Nelson ‘Research and Technological Progress in Industry-An analysis of the American 
Experience’ (International Symposium on Economic Development through Commercialization 
of Science and Technology, Hong Kong 2002). 
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having relinquished some small gain to a ‘partner’ institution in a 
particular project, will all too likely result in efforts by the institution’s 
solicitors to forestall such outcomes by imposing blanket ex ante 
restraints upon the actions in which individual employees participating in 
a collaborative project are allowed to engage. 
The three dynamics that have been reviewed in this section are at 
present only partially understood.  This is a problem, because the 
viability of various possible institutional arrangements to support e-
Science ventures depends to some extent upon knowledge of the 
situation in which many collaborators in a designated research area are 
likely to find themselves.  More information, therefore is needed not 
only about the direction of future institutional changes affecting PROs, 
but about current individual experiences with informal arrangements, 
and with the ways that formal legal rules are presently being utilised by 
co-operating institutions.  As information of this sort would be gathered 
more or less automatically as a part of the process recommended in the 
chapter’s fourth and concluding part, further discussion need not be 
pursued at this point.  
2.2  The Institutional Design Challenge: Analytics 
Seen in properly broad perspective, the global e-Science system design 
challenge is one of finding the set of technical and social and 
mechanisms that will provide the collaboration facilities, incentives and 
controls needed for human-machine research organisations to emerge 
and function efficiently in cyberspace.  Inevitably, this challenge will 
present itself in many different and very specific contexts in the course 
of the co-evolving interdependent adaptation of the system’s 
institutional and technological components. 
It follows that close attention should be devoted to the requirements of 
both sets of components, and to exploring the possibilities of applying 
ingenuity and resources to achieve innovative solutions in the 
institutional as well as the technological domains.  This will be a critical 
strategy not only for the long-term success of e-Science programmes, 
but for securing the potential benefits of the contribution they can make 
to enhance the effectiveness of collaborative work in many other areas 
of human endeavour.  
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2.2.1 ‘Collaboration Games’: Players, Interests and Rules 
To make headway towards that worthy objective, it is important to try to 
more clearly delineate the fundamental sources of the organisational and 
institutional problems that need to be addressed by PROs when defining 
the terms, rights, responsibilities and powers of the legal parties to 
research collaborations.  ‘Collaborating parties’ is of course a blanket 
term that covers at least four categories of entities/actors.  For the 
purposes of analysing the sources of such conflicts, the following should 
be distinguished:  
à the research scientists as individuals; 
à research units that have formal governance 
arrangements (departments, laboratories, and 
other consortia bound by agreements among the 
participating researchers); 
à host institutions with whom the researchers are 
connected by contracts, and through which they 
may receive financial or other material support 
(universities, public institutes, foundations and 
trusts, private partnerships and corporations); 
à public and charitable funding bodies, and private 
business organisations that furnish material 
support to PROs for the conduct of research 
(and related training) activities. 
These are presided over, of course, by national and international entities 
that may exercise primary or derived regulatory jurisdiction over both 
the individual researchers qua citizens (in the case of national 
governments) and their host institutions. 
For the purposes of a general discussion, and also in some specific 
contexts, it is helpful to further simplify matters by consolidating the 
foregoing list into two categories, the first pair of parties being lumped 
under the heading of ‘research collaborators’ and the second aggregated 
into ‘institutional partners/hosts’.  Seen from that highly stylised 
perspective, there are two sets of core difficulties of designing 
supporting institutional arrangements for collaborative projects.  These 
may then be succinctly characterised as arising in the first place from the 
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imperfect alignment of the interests of the research collaborators, on the 
one hand, and the institutional partners, on the other hand; and in the 
second place, from the existence of mal-alignments or outright clashes 
of interests among the institutional partners.  In some significant degree, 
the second class of difficulties also may contribute to the tension 
between the researchers whose goals impel them towards collaboration, 
and their respective institutional hosts for whom the terms of such 
coalitions may be problematic.  Only in what economists term ‘perfect 
teams’ is it appropriate to ignore the consequences of conflicting goals 
and interests among the parties, but in the world of human agents the 
‘perfect team’ is a conceptual device, not a reality. 
Incentives for competition and collaboration are important for both 
types of actors in e-Science collaborations.  But, it must be recognised 
that the point where those two forces would be ‘naturally’ balanced is 
not the same in the typical case of collaborating researchers as it for the 
institutional entities (i.e. public and private corporations and institutes 
and universities) that enter into a research partnership or consortium.  
The situation within scientific work-groups is usefully distinguished 
from that which typically holds among participating institutions, and can 
be examined first.  
Within scientific work-groups situated in academic milieux, it generally holds 
true that the ‘open science’ ethos and traditions of scientific co-
operation among researchers forms at least the point of departure (or 
default position) for the ‘bottom up’ organisation of collaborative 
activities.  This remains the predominant orientation, even though 
norms of co-operative behaviour are strained by rivalries for scientific 
recognition and reward; and it continues to be useful as a first-order 
idealisation of complex situations, the existence of considerable 
variations among the local mores characterising ‘open science’ 
communities in different fields of inquiry notwithstanding.  
What the future holds in this regard remains unclear.  A more elaborate 
and nuanced account of the current situation in academic science would 
emphasise the respects in which norms of professional behaviour and 
institutional policies are in flux.  It is uncertain that the traditionally 
prevalent disposition in favour of scientific co-operation will be able to 
withstand the pressures from the newly ascendant spirit of ‘academic 
entrepreneurship’.  Similarly, at the institutional level it is far from 
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obvious that commitment to the collective goal of ‘the pursuit of 
knowledge’ will continue to guide the policies embraced by a majority of 
leading research universities.  In many places it already has ceased to 
prevail in the face of the instrumental emphasis placed by public funding 
agencies upon the wealth-creation function of knowledge, and the 
growing legitimisation of the pursuit by researchers of personal wealth 
through ownership of intellectual property.36  Quite obviously, these are 
important issues not only for the scientific communities involved, but 
also for society at large.  Moreover, they are issues whose ultimate 
outcome can be powerfully shaped by the effects of myriad, seemingly 
small decisions about the technological and institutional infrastructures 
of e-Science. 
Among the institutional partners of a collaboration, by contrast with the 
scientists carrying out the research (and for whom publicly funded 
research universities may be said to serve as hosts), the predominant 
natural orientation lies more towards competition than co-operation.  
This generalisation may seem paradoxical, but at a fundamental level it 
follows from a simple contrast in motivations.  The primary objective of 
collaborating with other researchers is to gain access to the immediate 
data and informational fruits of each other’s knowledge.  But, data and 
information are public goods that may be exploited by all the 
collaborators in their respective research endeavours – without 
becoming exhausted or in any respect diminished.  By contrast, the 
driving motivation for the corporate entities to enter a research 
partnership or coalition (qua university or qua business corporation) is to 
gain access to material benefits that do not possess ‘public goods’ 
properties, so that the existence of opposing interests among them over 
the division of the pie is ineluctable.  When university/hosts are moved 
to become partners in a multi-institutional project, each is likely in some 
degree to be responding to the influence of derived motives for co-
operation – whether it is to accommodate the scientific work of 
academic collaborators, or thereby to gain the overhead funding, or the 
possible payoffs in prestige and command over material resources that a 
                                                        
36 See, for example, Jason Owen-Smith and Walter W Powell, ‘Careers and Contradictions: 
Faculty Responses to the Transformation of Knowledge and its Uses in the Life Sciences’ 
(2001) 10 Research in the Sociology of Work (Special Issue on The Transformation of Work, edited by 
Steven Vallas) 109–40.  
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successful project might bring.  But such co-operative and 
accommodating motivations tend to be tempered, and sometimes over-
ridden by the attention that the institutions accord to protecting and 
promoting their respective individual, and essentially competing 
interests.  
Where universities are involved as the proximate corporate parties, the 
primary impetus towards facilitating co-operation derives largely from 
the interests of the researchers themselves.  This impetus also is likely to 
be reinforced by the terms on which funding may be obtained from the 
public sponsors of those research projects.  In addition to the 
prospective division of whatever ‘pie’ will thus be made available to the 
coalition, the negotiated terms of each institution of higher education’s 
(HEI) immediate relationships with its institutional partners also must be 
shaped by its entirely understandable concern to manage the 
uncertainties surrounding the conflict-laden aspects of these 
partnerships.  Moreover, in the United Kingdom and other countries, 
the policies of governments now encourage higher education institutions 
and other non-profit research organisations (such as research hospitals) 
to try to exploit – whether for themselves or for their own private sector 
partners – the intellectual property arising from the contractually 
specified activities engaged in by their employees, and even their 
students.  It is especially relevant for e-Science (as it is also for e-
Learning) that these legal and administrative arrangements for 
institutional appropriation of the benefits of new knowledge have been 
focused particularly upon works created in the form of digital 
information. 
Furthermore, the United Kingdom’s government (along with other 
states in the European Union) appears to be pursuing regional 
development strategies based upon the formation of business ‘clusters’ 
in the environs of publicly supported research institutions, and the 
promotion of industrial enterprises founded by the licensing of 
intellectual property generated within the university, or in university-
industry research partnerships.  University leaders are understandably 
responsive to the prospects of direct and indirect benefits they may 
derive by successfully fulfilling this development role, and are thereby 
induced to aggressively seek to expand and exploit their intellectual 
property portfolios.  It might be noticed, however, that presently there is 
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very little in the incentive structure that enjoins United Kingdom 
institutions to consider the burdens that their policies in the latter regard 
can impose upon the work of their own research and teaching activities; 
and, a fortiori, upon the parallel activities carried on by colleagues at other 
institutions in the UK.  Indeed, nothing in the present incentive 
structure requires a non-profit, publicly subsidised HEI to consider 
whether its intellectual property licensing strategies, and its promotion of 
university ‘start-ups’, will be likely to impose burdens upon the 
innovation activities of private commercial firms.  
2.2.2 Cooperation v Competition When Assets are Complements: Some 
Guidance from Economic Analysis 
For the purposes of this chapter, the foregoing conditions may be taken 
to characterise the prevailing and prospective state of affairs.  They thus 
describe the pertinent environment within which practical institutional 
arrangements for the conduct of collaborative e-Science will need to be 
achieved.  It may be argued that societal interests would be better served 
by promoting more active co-operation among the public sector entities, 
whereas the recent thrust of government policy (in the United Kingdom 
particularly) has been to encourage higher education institutions to form 
co-operative relations with business companies while competing ever 
more vigorously with each another for command over material 
resources.  But, in the likely absence of a radical policy reversal, the task 
of creating an appropriate institutional infrastructure for e-Science must 
be one of devising mechanisms that are better able to strike the socially 
most efficient attainable balance between the proximate goals of 
collaborating researchers and the immediate objectives of their host 
institutions.  
The rationale for choosing this particular ‘second best strategy’ is not 
that scientific collaborators should be accommodated because they are 
intrinsically good, more selfless, and more worthy of trust than other 
members of society.  Quite the contrary.  Precisely that reality must be 
taken into account by the internal governance structures of the 
institutions that employ human agents and support their activities, 
whether scientific or other.  The stance adopted in here derives from a 
different consideration altogether: namely, a recognition of the larger 
beneficial consequences for society that derive from the strong 
imperatives for co-operative behaviours in the field of scientific inquiry 
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(and equally in other complex forms of cultural production).  This 
rationale follows from some fundamental propositions in the economics 
of knowledge and information, and their application to the analysis of 
the role of implicit and explicit collaborations scientific and 
technological research.  
Modern economic analysis of the production and distribution of reliable 
knowledge proceeds from the widely accepted proposition that the 
advancement of scientific knowledge and the technological progress are 
intertwined cumulative processes.  Both are synergised by 
complementarities among the data and informational inputs that enter 
into systematic research activities and which, in turn, are the primary 
outputs of those activities.37  Co-operative sharing of knowledge 
resources is well known to be the most efficient allocational scheme for 
the production of goods when different agents hold complementary 
inputs.  This holds for normal economic goods, and is true for data and 
information – true, a fortiori, as these possess special properties that 
render them akin to ‘pure public goods’.  The latter typically are integral 
and hence indivisible; yet they are infinitely expansible, being useable 
repeatedly and concurrently by many agents without becoming depleted 
or otherwise exhausted.  Furthermore, to utilise such goods while 
denying others access to them is typically costly to arrange, even when it 
is technically feasible.  
Formal analysis based upon the foregoing propositions has established 
an important result that also (satisfyingly) receives confirmation in 
behavioural experiments.38  Where the complementary elements required 
                                                        
37 For a more extensive presentation see, for example, P A David, ‘The Economic Logic of 
‘Open Science’ and the Balance between Private Property Rights and the Public Domain in 
Scientific Data and Information: A Primer’, forthcoming in National Research Council, The Role 
of the Public Domain in Scientific and Technical Data and Information: A Symposium (2003) National 
Academy Press <http://siepr.stanford.edu/papers/pdf/02–30.html>.  
38 See James Buchanan and Yong J Yoon, ‘Symmetric Tragedies: Commons and Anticommons’ 
(2000) April 43(1) Journal of Law and Economics for a theoretical analysis that makes use of 
Cournot’s theory of oligopoly behaviour in markets for complementary products.  On the 
latter, see Carl Shapiro, ‘Theories of Oligopoly Behavior’ in R Schmalensee and R Willig (eds), 
Handbook of Industrial Organization (1989) 330–414.  Carl Shapiro ‘Navigating the Patent Thicket: 
Cross Licenses, Patent Pools, and Standard-Setting’ in A Jaffee, J Lerner and S Stern (eds) 
Innovation Policy and the Economy (2003) vol 1, develops the argument that where intellectual 
property rights in complements are distributed among many agents, compulsory ‘pooling’ of 
rights and cartel pricing yields a socially more efficient allocation than absolute individual 
monopoly rights of the sort granted to patent-holders.  For experimental validations of 
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to obtain a valued outcome are controlled by multiple agents, each of 
whom has the power to exclude others from use of at least one input, 
the ‘prices’ that these private goal-seeking agents independently will 
place upon the resources under their respective control will be too high.  
That is to say, they will fail to consider the upward-cascading effects of 
the charges they set for access to their respective resource-holdings, with 
the result that the level of level of production in the system as a whole is 
sub-optimally low. 
Moreover, if there are as well strong complementarities in the use of the 
outputs for final purposes (such as commercial innovations based upon 
scientific discoveries or research tools), the dispersal of exclusive 
ownership (and hence access control) among many parties tends to yield 
a less-than-socially optimal degree of utilisation of the available 
information-inputs, and a correspondingly sub-optimal level of 
consumption of the final goods.  Overall, the anticipated results of the 
envisaged ‘anti-commons’ equilibrium are less socially efficient than 
those that would be obtained were the knowledge production activity to 
be organised under the terms of an intellectual property licensing ‘pool’ 
that pursued a monopoly pricing policy. 
The latter is a very strong finding indeed.  It is widely accepted that 
regimes characterised by competitive rivalry generate incentives for cost 
minimisation and efforts to satisfy the needs of final consumers, whereas 
monopoly imposes significant inefficiencies, particularly where the 
product that is monopolised possesses the properties of a pure public 
good’ – which is the case for information-goods.  Hence, finding 
principles for formally organising e-Science collaborations, and doing so 
under contractual terms that manage to avoid outcomes that will be 
‘worse than monopoly’ is a challenge well worth trying to meet.   
                                                                                                                  
propositions about the symmetry and commons and anti-commons forms of market failures, 
see Charles F Mason and Owen R Phillips, ‘Mitigating the Tragedy of the Commons through 
Cooperation: An Experimental Evaluation’ (1997) 34 Journal of Environmental Economics and 
Management 148–72; Steven Steward and David J Bjornstad, ‘An Experimental Investigation of 
Predictions and Symmetries in the Tragedies of the Commons and Anticommons’ Joint Institute 
for Energy & Environment Report, JIEE 2002–07 (August 2002). 
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2.3 The Formal Legal Context for Collaborative e-Science 
It is notoriously difficult to describe exhaustively the legal issues that 
could arise from the many different types of collaborative e-Science 
project.  Nevertheless, common patterns of legal problem are likely to 
arise.  These concern the legal relationship between the parties to an e-
Science collaboration, the material that the parties bring to an e-Science 
collaboration, the material to which such a collaboration gives rise and 
the liability of the parties for harms arising from the project.  Each of 
these issues merits separate consideration.  That consideration must 
remain fairly general as the identification of legal issues is very fact-
sensitive.  But, even general consideration of the likely issues suffices to 
reveal the complexity of the legal context in which collaborative e-
Science will operate.  In light of that complexity, it is clear that these are 
issues that cannot be navigated by individual scientists, and that 
institutional arrangements similar to those outlined in the final section of 
this chapter will be essential. 
2.3.1  Relationships among the Collaborating Parties 
The legal rules that govern disputes between the parties to an on-line 
collaboration are determined by the nature of the legal relationship 
between those parties.  Three possibilities suggest themselves.  First, the 
parties may be in no particular legal relationship and the general law will 
determine issues such as the allocation of the fruits of their joint 
activities.  This situation is the most unlikely in all but the smallest and 
most informal of collaborations.  Second, the parties may be in a 
contractual relationship.  If they are, then the terms of that contract will 
in most circumstances determine the conduct of their relationship and 
the allocation of its outcomes.  Third, the parties to collaboration may 
establish some type of institutional vehicle for their collaboration such as 
a joint venture company.  This is the most formal way of establishing a 
collaborative relationship.  It has the advantage that it can facilitate the 
structuring of complex relationships.  It also means that individuals and 
institutions can avoid liability in situations in which a collaborative 
project may give rise to harm to third parties.  However, it entails the 
maintenance of a system of legal formalities that is likely to make it 
unattractive to all but the very largest of collaborations. 
Of these three possibilities, the most likely one is that the relationship 
between the parties will be governed by either an express or implied 
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contract.  The question of whether the parties are in a contractual 
relationship is not simply that of whether they have entered into a 
written agreement.  Even in situations in which the parties cannot point 
to any such written agreement, the courts may well determine that they 
are bound by contract either because of an express verbal agreement 
between them or because the court is prepared to imply a contractual 
relationship.  The freedom that parties have to enter into contractual 
relations can give them considerable control over the conduct of their 
relationship and the allocation of its outcomes.  But, difficulties may 
arise; both when collaborators find themselves party to contracts the 
terms of which they did not expressly agree and, alternatively, when 
apparent agreements between collaborators are ineffective as contracts.  
A first difficulty that arises in relation to the contractual organisation of 
the relationship between collaborators relates to the issue of when, and 
on what terms, their relationship is formed.  This problem will not arise 
in circumstances in which the collaboration is based on a written signed 
agreement which is remade by all the parties to the collaboration each 
time its terms are amended or the identity of the parties changes.  Many 
collaborations, however, will be organised on a more informal basis.  A 
part of the attraction of e-Science is that it can involve many different 
parties with different contributions to make who become involved at 
different stages in a project.  Two particular problems are likely to 
emerge.  First, the parties to a collaborative project will often amend 
their agreement informally during its life.  This may cause a problem if 
one of the parties is promising to do more than she undertook under the 
original contract, while the other is not.  Under English law, the problem 
of giving effect to such amendments is a textbook difficulty in the law of 
contract.  Other legal systems have less difficulty with such situations 
and the English courts have been working to find a solution to the 
problem.  Nevertheless, it is one that may well arise in on-going 
scientific collaborations.  
Second, latecomers to a project may be included in its work without 
entering into an express agreement with all the existing parties.39  In 
                                                        
39 Academic lawyers puzzle over cases such as Clarke v Dunraven (1895) P 248 and how rules of 
contract law designed to reflect the paradigm of two or more parties in an express agreement 
on terms that govern their relationship throughout its life can be adapted to the context in 
which parties attempt to join a single agreement at different points in time. 
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relation to the rules of unincorporated members’ clubs, the law has 
developed methods for dealing with the problem of how contracts 
governing on-going relationships can be extended to include new-
comers.  In such contexts it is generally assumed that the members of a 
club are in contractual relations with one another; that the terms of that 
contractual relationship are set out in club rules, including procedures 
for the admission of new members; and that those rules can only be 
altered either in the manner prescribed in the rules themselves or by the 
agreement of every member of the club.  There is no reason why such 
an approach might not also be adopted as a means of organising the 
entrance of participants who joined the collaboration at various points 
after its inception.  This may not be possible, however, if the newcomer 
were to enter the relationship on a basis that has not been anticipated at 
the outset of the project.  Moreover, even in situations in which the 
agreement between the collaborators allowed for the admission of new-
comers, the terms of the contract among the original members of a 
collaboration would need to be made clear to the late-comer.  The 
difficulty with contractual analyses of these types is that the outcome to 
a dispute between the parties, particularly one involving parties to a 
collaborative relationship who have joined at different points in time, 
may not reflect the expectations of all the parties. Indeed, such 
expectations are unlikely to coincide. 
A second difficulty will concern the appropriate parties to any written 
contract that forms the basis of the collaboration.  For example, a 
written agreement may be arrived at among institutions rather than 
individuals, but a collaboration will require agreements (whether formal 
or informal) among particular individuals who possess with particular 
expertise.  Difficulties may arise where an institution enters into an 
arrangement for a particular collaboration, the individual who is central 
to the collaboration moves institutions and the original institution seeks 
to replace them and to continue the project with someone with whom 
the other collaborators are not content.  A similar difficulty might arise 
in the context in which the parties to collaboration assume that they are 
entitled to the fruits of that collaboration but, in fact, the general law 
grants first ownership of those fruits to another party.  An example of 
this might be the situation in which individual collaborators assume that 
they are able to make arrangements concerning the fruits of their 
collaboration, but at least one party’s share falls under the general law to 
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the institution by which she is employed.  There are various ways in 
which such problems can be overcome, but it is essential that the issue 
of the most appropriate contracting parties be addressed before the 
project begins. 
This highlights a third potential difficulty with the contractual 
organisation of a collaborative research project.  Where the fruits of a 
collaborative arrangement constitute the subject matter of one of the 
statutory intellectual property regimes, the statutory code itself allocates 
its first ownership.  As outlined below, the parties to collaboration are 
free to arrange between themselves that the normal rules for the 
allocation of property in such circumstances should be altered.  Yet, the 
process of doing so involves some possible pitfalls.  In particular, 
informal agreements may be difficult to enforce.  Take, for example, the 
situation in which one of the parties to collaboration writes the software 
upon which the project is based and copyright law allocates first 
ownership of that software to her.  The author of the software may, by 
agreement, assign her interest in the software to her collaborators or 
license them to use it.  She may even, as a part of the original 
collaboration agreement, have assigned her interest in any prospective 
works, including the software that she might write as a part of the 
project.  In the United Kingdom, this is provided for by section 91 of 
the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988.  However, to do so she must 
comply with the legal requirements of such an assignment and under 
section 90 of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988, these include a 
requirement that assignments be in writing signed by the assignor.  Any 
agreement that may be entered into as to the allocation of the fruits of 
collaborative work must not only be clear and made between the 
appropriate parties, but also meet the formalities required by any 
applicable law. 
A fourth set of difficulties relates to the often-unequal bargaining power 
of the parties to collaboration.  The law is able only in the most extreme 
circumstances to correct the effects of unequal bargaining power.  This 
is one reason why it is vital that common understandings of the 
appropriate response to particular issues that arise in planning scientific 
collaborations should be developed.  Scientists may come under 
considerable pressure from their commercial partners to agree to terms 
that do not further the goals of collaborative research generally, and to 
which they would prefer not to agree.  To illustrate this point, one may 
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consider the way that the effects of such asymmetries shaped the 
outcome of an unusual bargaining situation involving intellectual 
property, a recent case where no revenues from IP licensing were at 
stake.  The case in question involved negotiations between the publicly 
funded Globus Project at the Argonne National Laboratories (Chicago) 
over the form of the ‘open source’ license for the Globus Toolkit 
software under which major business firms – including IBM and Oracle 
to be specific – would undertake the distribution of that software 
package.40 
Compared with those companies, the Globus Project had very limited 
capabilities to engage on its own in a widespread ‘free and open source’ 
distribution of the Globus Toolkit software.  It might have done just 
that under the familiar form of GNU General Public Licence (GNU 
GPL).41  But IBM and Oracle were unwilling to expose themselves to 
ranges of risks they perceived would ensue were they to distribute code 
under the ‘copyleft’ type of license familiar in ‘free and open source 
software’ (F/OSS) products released under GNU GPL.  Recognition of 
its limited leverage, and a desire to rapidly establish the GT protocols as 
                                                        
40 See David and Spence (2003/2004), Appendix 4  (The Globus Project’s Approach to 
Software Licensing) for further details and references. 
41 The question of whether or not a computer program qualifies as ‘free and open source 
software’ (F/OSS) can be approached as a matter of legal definition.  (See David McGowan, 
‘Legal Implications of Open Source Software’ (2001) 241 University of Illinois Law Review.)  
Copyright law gives developers who write programs the exclusive right to reproduce the code, 
distribute it, and make works derived from their original work.  Copyright holders can grant 
other parties permission to do such things through licenses, and ‘free’ software or ‘open source’ 
software refers to software distributed under licenses with particular sorts of terms.  The ‘Open 
Source Definition’ (maintained by the Open Source Initiative, see The Open Source Definition 
version 1.9 <www.opensource.org/osd.html>) provides a convenient and widely accepted 
reference guide to such licenses.  It sets out several conditions a license must satisfy if code 
subject to the license is to qualify as ‘open source software’.  Several well-known licenses satisfy 
the Open Source Definition, the most widely used and still more widely discussed among them 
being the GNU General Public License (GPL).  Programs distributed under a F/OSS license 
‘must include source code, and must allow distribution in source code as well as compiled 
form; it also must allow modifications and derived (GPL’d) works, and ‘permit them to be 
distributed under the same terms as the license of the original software’.  Such a license does 
not restrict any party ‘from selling or giving away the software as a component of an aggregate 
software distribution containing programs from several different sources,’ but the licensee 
cannot ‘require a royalty or other fee for such sale.’  Much of the attention given to F/OSS 
development focuses on the GPL’s requirement that authors who copy and distribute programs 
based on GPL’d code (derivative works) must distribute those programs under the GPL.  This 
requirement is specified in Section 2(b) of the GPL and is referred to as the ‘copyleft’ term.  
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a Grid standard, appears to have been sufficient grounds for the Globus 
Project to accede to its industrial partners’ demands by working with the 
companies’ attorneys to devise a customised software license.42  
The effects of asymmetry of bargaining power are further revealed by 
considering a parallel case of negotiation, in which a different and less 
restrictive form of software license was adopted.  Sun Microcomputer’s 
Project JXTA has created a set of open, generalised peer-to-peer 
protocols that allow any connected device (cell phone, to PDA, PC to 
server) on the network to communicate and collaborate.  The source 
code for Project JXTA has been released under a variant of the Apache 
software License: The Sun Project JXTA Software License is functionally 
equivalent to the Apache Software License (Version 1.1), with minor changes 
to reflect the Project JXTA name and Sun Microsystems as the original 
contributor.  In addition, by contrast with the Globus Toolkit’s exacting 
‘contributor’s agreement’, a developer seeking to contribute to Project 
JXTA – either through patches or by becoming a ‘Committer and/or 
Project Owner’ – can sign an agreement similar to the one required by 
the Apache Software Foundation.  The contributors simply attest that to 
the best of their knowledge the code submitted is their own 
development work, and that they possess the authority to provide it and 
any related intellectual property to Project JXTA.  In this case, the 
software development project had access to distribution capabilities, 
giving Sun the freedom to make use of the less restrictive and more 
familiar terms in the Apache Foundation’s agreements.43  
                                                        
42 For reasons that similarly may have been rooted in the risk averse stance of IBM and Oracle, 
these negotiations also resulted in the creation of a novel form of agreement governing future 
contributions of code to the Globus Project.  Contributing developers must grant Globus a 
perpetual, world-wide royalty-free license to use the submitted code, and automatically would 
lose their right to use Globus Toolkit were they to file suit for infringement of their intellectual 
property rights in their contribution(s).  See David and Spence (2003/2004).  
43 It may be noted that Sun sells a range of complementary JXTA products (software 
applications) that are available under proprietary software licenses, as well as commercial 
software systems services.  On the emergence of business models that build commercial 
offerings around free and open source software, see the survey in S Arora and P A David, 
‘Commercialization of Open-source: Symbiotic or Parasitical?’ (SIEPR-Project NOSTRA 
Working Paper, Stanford University, May 2003 - papers from this project are available at: 
<http://siepr.stanford.edu/programs/OpenSoftware_David/NSFOSF_Publications.html>); 
Carlo Daffara, Business Models in FLOSS-based Software Companies 
<http://opensource.mit.edu/papers/OSSEMP07-daffara.pdf>. 
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A fifth set of complexities may arise because the parties to collaboration, 
or their institutional employers, are in several different legal jurisdictions.  
In such a circumstance, one or more of the relevant parties may assert 
that issues concerning the existence, interpretation and enforcement of a 
purported contractual relationship should be determined according to 
the law of their own jurisdiction or by their own courts.  They may also 
assert that issues concerning the first ownership of the fruits of 
collaboration are matters for their own law and their own courts.  This 
becomes a matter for the complex rules as to the conflict of laws.  
Questions concerning the law applicable to disputes concerning 
collaboration contracts will be governed in the English courts by the 
terms of the 1980 Rome Convention on the Law Applicable to Contractual 
Obligations.  Under the terms of this Convention, the parties can choose 
the law that will govern disputes as to their contractual relationship, 
including its validity, by carefully worked out choice of law clauses 
included in express agreements.  Yet, the ability of the parties to choose 
the law applicable to contractual disputes concerning intellectual 
property sometimes will be limited under the Convention by the 
application of a ‘mandatory’ rule as to the applicable law.  In situations 
where no such choice of law clause is included, complex rules will 
determine which law ought to govern the contract.  Under Article 4 of 
the Rome Convention, this will be the law of the country which has the 
closest connection with which the contract or, in cases concerning the 
existence of a contractual relationship, with the purported contract.  In 
ordinary commercial situations, however, a number of more or less 
clearly formulated presumptions govern the issue of what constitutes 
connection with a particular country.  But, it would be very difficult to 
predict what might be taken to be ‘connected with a particular country’ 
in the context of a collaboration agreement that pertained to activities 
carried on in several different jurisdictions, none of which could be said 
to be the ‘home’ of the project.  Legal doctrine concerned with ‘conflict 
of laws’ has yet to come to terms with activities that take place in no 
particular territory.  Once again, it should be emphasised that issues 
concerning contracts that involve intellectual property rights pose special 
legal difficulties.  
Questions as to the jurisdiction of the English courts in disputes 
concerning collaboration contracts are likely to be governed by a 
regulation of the European Union, Council Regulation (EC) 44/2001 of 22 
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December 2000 on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of 
judgments in civil and commercial matters.  Article 23 of that Regulation 
permits parties to make agreements as to the courts that will have 
jurisdiction over their disputes.  This provision applies when one of the 
parties is domiciled in a Member State of the European Union, but a 
similar possibility exists at common law.  In the absence of such an 
agreement, extremely complex rules will determine jurisdiction, these 
rules starting from the presumption that a defendant ought to be sued in 
his or her own jurisdiction.  The rules governing jurisdiction in the 
absence of express agreement will again vary depending upon whether 
the defendant is, or is not, domiciled in a Member State of the European 
Union.  Moreover, disputes involving multiple parties from different 
countries add a further layer of complexity to the rules determining 
jurisdiction.  It is essential that the arrangements underpinning 
international collaborations include clear and effective choices about 
both the laws applicable to the collaboration and the courts in which 
disputes concerning it will be heard. 
A sixth set of problems arises because of the expertise required to 
interpret contracts for scientific collaboration.  It may be that the parties 
to a scientific collaboration cannot agree on the courts in which they 
would like their disputes to be resolved simply because they do not 
believe that any court in any jurisdiction has the expertise to interpret 
the contract.  This may either be because the contract touches upon 
technical issues, or because they want the contract to be interpreted by 
someone who understands the cultural norms of the scientific 
community in which they are operating.  In such circumstances, the 
parties may enter into an agreement that their disputes will be subject to 
arbitration or mediation rather than to the jurisdiction of a court.  In 
most jurisdictions there is provision, as there is in the United Kingdom 
under the Arbitration Act 1996, to render the decisions of arbitrators 
binding in most cases and the parties may well choose to do so in 
situations in which they have chosen an arbitrator for her scientific 
expertise.  In such circumstances, the parties may also agree to the legal 
or other standards by which their dispute is to be resolved.  Arbitration 
can be relatively less expensive than court proceedings and the choice of 
an arbitrator to resolve disputes may solve some of the difficulties 
associated with international collaborations. 
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From these doctrinal considerations, then, it is clear that close attention 
must be paid to the legal basis of a collaborative relationship right at the 
outset of the project.  But the potentially high cost to the project of 
negotiating its every possible outcome is extremely high.  The third part 
of this chapter is devoted to developing a mechanism for minimising 
that particular problem.  To anticipate, it seems that there is a need to 
develop an array of standard contractual clauses, covering particular 
issues that are likely to arise in e-Science collaborations and a set of 
principles for the development of such agreements.  This approach is 
not to advocate the introduction of a set of standard e-Science 
collaboration agreements.  The formulation of such agreements would 
be an almost impossible task given the likely diversity of e-Science 
projects and the fact that the uses of the technology supporting on-line 
collaboration are currently largely unknown.  Standard form agreements 
may petrify norms at an early stage in the development of the social 
practice of e-Science.  Moreover, standard form agreements are fraught 
with legal risk.  The development of standard clauses, rather than 
standard form contracts, and principles for the use of those clauses is 
likely to yield a far more reliable mechanism for producing robust 
collaboration agreements at a minimum cost to the relationship of those 
involved. 
2.3.2 Issues Regarding Material Contributed to Collaborations 
Three questions arise in relation to the material that is contributed to on-
line collaborative projects.  The first relates to the legal risk to which a 
party to such collaboration might be exposed by the use of material 
contributed to it by another participating party.  The second relates to 
the extent to which the pooling of resources protected by intellectual 
property rights might constitute a breach of the rules of competition law.  
A third relates to the extent to which the contribution of particular 
resources gives a party a claim to the product of a particular 
collaborative research activity. 
2.3.2.1 Legal Risk 
Take first the question of legal risk.  An important feature of establishing 
trust between the partners to on-line collaborative research will be the 
extent to which they can confidently use the resources that each brings 
to the collaboration.  Each party will need to know that her involvement 
with the project has not exposed his or her to unanticipated legal risk to 
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third parties.  Assume that two parties to a collaboration bring material 
together for a database in the health care sector.  The material that they 
bring may well be the subject of data protection rights, rights against 
breach of confidence, or intellectual property rights such as copyright 
and database right, which are violated by its use as part of the project.  A 
party to a collaboration who receives and uses such material may be in 
breach of her obligations under data protection or intellectual property 
laws – even though ignorant of the fact that the data in question 
contains material for whose use adequate consent was not obtained, and 
thus constituted material infringing an intellectual property right.  In 
general, information received in breach of an obligation of confidence 
will be protected only if there is notice at some time before the 
information is used of the circumstances in which the information has 
been obtained.  (The requisite notice, however, may be constructive 
rather than actual.)  
At least in relation to obligations as to data protection, copyright and the 
database right, this risk may be less great than it at first appears.  Under 
the terms of the European law of data protection – enacted in the 
United Kingdom as the Data Protection Act 1988 – consent will not be 
necessary for the secondary use if the data does not relate to identifiable 
individuals.  It will, in any case, be available to scientific research without 
additional consent, as long as it is not being used to support decisions 
with respect to particular individuals, or used in a way that is likely to 
cause substantial distress to an individual data subject.  Similarly, an 
exception to infringement of copyright and database rights exists as long 
as the use of the protected material is for research the use is not 
‘commercial’.44  Importantly, however, no broad research exemption 
exists in relation to patent rights.  Although patent lawyers often talk of 
a research exemption, in practice it is extremely limited.45  The risk that 
legal consequences attach to the use of material brought by a partner to 
                                                        
44  The reference here is to the Copyright and Rights in Databases Regulations 1997 section 20 and 
the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988 section 29.  The latter is soon to be amended under 
the terms of Directive 2001/29/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 May 
2001 – on the harmonisation of certain aspects of copyright and related rights in the 
information society. 
45  For the UK see Monsanto Co v Stauffer Chemical Co [1985] RPC 515 and Smith Kline & French 
Laboratories Limited v Evans Medical Limited [1989] FSR 513.  For the US, see Madey v Duke 
University 307 F3d 1351 (2002), cert denied 539 US 958 (2003).  
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collaboration is a real one.  This risk is exacerbated in the context of the 
use of the potentially unlawful material in international collaborations, 
and particularly those that take place over the Internet.  But even in the 
straightforward situation involving the law of only one jurisdiction, the 
problem of legal risk remains an important consideration in the 
establishment of collaborations. 
The lawyer’s answer to the foregoing problem is that the parties to 
collaboration ought to take cross-indemnities from one another as 
regards liability arising from the research material that each expects to 
provide.  There are two difficulties with such a solution.  The first, 
though somewhat theoretical, is that it will not protect a party from 
criminal responsibility in the unusual situation in which use of the 
material constitutes an offence in some jurisdiction whose courts find its 
law applicable.  The second, and more real, difficulty is that the 
negotiation of an indemnity clause may operate to undermine, rather 
than to build, the trust that is necessary to establish an effective working 
relationship.  This effect may be exacerbated when, as is usual, it is an 
institution that is entering a collaboration agreement and not individual 
collaborators.  In most circumstances it will be an employing institution 
that will be vicariously liable for the wrongful acts committed by those in 
its employment and lawyers for the institution may well seek the 
strongest protection that can be negotiated.  This is another situation in 
which the development of standard form clauses and principles for their 
implementation may effectively avoid the potential costs to a 
collaborative relationship of the need to anticipate the problems that a 
project might entail before it has begun.  Once such indemnities became 
established in a field of scientific collaboration, the inclusion of them in 
a contract governing a particular relationship betokens less suspicion of 
a particular collaborator. 
Of course, another and more positive way of addressing these questions 
about the legality of the materials used by a collaborative project is to see 
it not as a problem of legal risk, but as a matter of good information 
management.  The United Kingdom e-Science ‘Pilot’ project known as 
CLEF is working to build a system that connects databases in the 
healthcare sector.  The framework will integrate clinical histories, 
radiology and pathology reports, annotations on genomic and image 
databases, technical literature and web-based resources to serve the 
needs of patients, their families and carers, clinical professionals and 
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biomedical scientists, healthcare enterprises and the public at large.  
CLEF is acutely aware of the importance of ethical and legal issues 
regarding, in particular confidentiality and intellectual property.  One of 
the stated goals of the project is to devise agreed policies on information 
governance and technical measures for their enforcement.  CLEF 
follows a two-pronged strategy to ensure that it has permission for the 
use of data protected by confidentiality and intellectual property rules.  
The first strategy is to enlist the intellectual property owners and 
confidentiality watch-dogs as collaborators or supporters.  The second is 
to foster consensus on information governance policies among these 
partners.  The emergence of standard form contracts in the formation of 
collaborative databases could help to spread and to entrench these 
agreed standards of good information management in similar 
applications contexts. 
2.3.2.2  Competition Law 
The second issue that arises in relation to the material contributed to an 
e-Science collaboration concerns the rules of competition law.  The 
parties to a contract governing a collaborative project need to be careful 
that their agreements are not subject to control by the relevant 
competition law authorities.  This will occur in situations in which 
collaborative agreements are either collusive or constitute an abuse of a 
dominant position.  In the European Union Articles 81 and 82 of the 
EC Treaty render such behaviour unlawful.  The danger of falling foul of 
Article 81 arises particularly when parties to a collaborative agreement 
pool resources such as intellectual property in a way that has the effect 
of excluding competition.  Imagine, for example, that a number of 
research groups own database rights in a series of databases which, if 
pooled, would effectively cover the field of a particular area of research: 
in some circumstances the very creation of such a pool may be anti-
competitive under the principles of European competition law.  
Alternatively, the creation of the pool may be allowed either under the 
terms of Article 81(3), which exempts from the operation of Article 81 
certain agreements relating to research and development and the 
licensing of its results; it also could be found permissible under the terms 
of the technology transfer block exemption.46 
                                                        
46  Commission Regulation (EC) No 240/96 of 31 January 1996 on the application of Article 85(3) of 
the Treaty to certain categories of technology transfer agreements. 
Designing Institutional Infrastructures for e-Science 
 
109
In some other circumstances the resources to which a collaborative 
project gives rise may also create competition law problems under the 
principles expressed in cases such as C-76/89R, C- 77/89R and C-
91/89R RTE and Others v Commission [1989] ECR 1141.  Such a situation 
would occur when the fruit of a collaborative research project becomes 
established as a dominant industry standard in a particular area of 
technology.  The Globus Toolkit example discussed below offers an 
instance of just such a suite of technical specifications which may 
emerge as the de facto Grid standard.  But there the issues of potential 
abuse of monopoly rights over an ‘essential facility’ have, in a sense been 
fully anticipated by the Globus Project, and therefore are unlikely to 
arise; the Globus Project and its industrial partners have agreed that GT 
is to be distributed as ‘open source’ software package on a royalty free 
basis, under the terms of a (newly designed) form of public license. 
In this connection it may be remarked that the use of ‘free and open 
source software’ (F/OSS) licenses such as the GNU GPL obviously 
offers an attractive way of invoking copyright law to deal with many of 
the difficult legal complications that otherwise arise from the ownership 
of intellectual property arising from ‘horizontal’ collaborations (i.e., 
collaborations at the same stage of production and distribution).  But, 
F/OSS licenses equally can facilitate the resolution of issues arising 
among the parties to ‘vertical’ collaboration agreements – as has been 
demonstrated in the case of the Globus Toolkit.  Where public funds 
support the development of infrastructure technologies of this sort, 
especially network technologies for which interoperability 
standardisation is critical, such solutions might be fully justified on 
economic efficiency grounds.  Yet, at present the United Kingdom and 
other governments have held back from embracing this approach as a 
general principle.  Indeed, as has been noted, the recent direction of 
government policies vis-à-vis PRO’s has been to encourage the 
generation of revenue through the use of proprietary software licenses.47  
                                                        
47 Copyright law has been invoked by commercial software vendors in distributing programs 
physically and electronically under a variety of ‘shrink-wrap’, ‘click-wrap’ and ‘browse-wrap’ 
licenses.  In David and Spence (2003/2004: Appendix 4: section 2.3), notice is taken of an 
objection to the royalty-free terms of the Globus Toolkit Public License made by an evaluator 
of the GT protocol suite: the commentator, from a British university pointed out that the UK 
government, and the researchers themselves, expected to see their middleware (platforms) and 
applications generate revenues from licensing agreements.  
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In this environment the issues of claims to the fruits of ‘essential’ 
research tools created by publicly supported collaborative projects will 
have to be thought though very carefully with regard to the implications 
of competition law as well as intellectual property law.  
The whole issue of the potential competition law problems involved in 
the establishment of e-Science collaborations and the exploitation of 
their fruits has been thoroughly addressed in the recent European 
Research Area Expert Group Report on Strategic Use and Adaptation of 
intellectual Property Rights Systems in Information and Communications 
Technologies-based Research.  The conclusion of that Report is that the 
current application of the law to collaborative research remains unclear, 
and that: 
… some clearer guidance from the Commission would be 
welcome on how it sees competition law applying in 
situations when industry standards require the use of a 
technology that is IP-protected and when access to research 
tools that are IP-protected is denied, or granted only at 
unreasonable rates.48 
2.3.2.3  Individual contributor’s claims to the fruits of collaboration  
The third question to be considered regarding materials contributed to 
research collaboration is whether one party’s contribution can give rise 
to a claim to the fruits of the whole project.  This is a very complex legal 
matter.  The nature of the answer turns, in large part, upon the nature of 
the contribution.  Whether or not the latter will give rise to such a claim 
depends largely upon the rules as to the ownership of the fruits of a 
collaboration – a subject to be considered in the section following this.  
This is an important matter that deserves emphasis because when the 
parties to a collaborative project consider the allocation of the fruits of 
the collective efforts, they quite naturally tend to focus on the resources 
that each has brought to the project.  But, as will be evident from the 
discussion in the following section, the significance that the parties 
attach to the nature (and scientific or economic value) of their respective 
contributions is not reflected in the legal rules concerning the allocation 
of first ownership of the fruits of a (scientific) collaboration.  
                                                        
48 European Research Area Expert Group Report on Strategic Use and adaptation of Intellectual 
Property Rights Systems in Information and Communications Technologies-based Research (2003) 26. 
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2.3.3  Issues Surrounding Material Arising from Collaboration 
A scientific collaboration may give rise to ‘information goods’ and 
‘knowledge resources’ of many different kinds.  These ‘outputs’ may be 
protected as confidential information as long as they are kept secret.  In 
some jurisdictions they may also, though very rarely, be protected by the 
law of tort under the general action against misappropriation.  This tort 
prevents one party from ‘reaping without sowing’ by exploiting a 
valuable intangible that another has created and, in effect, amounts to an 
uncodified system of intellectual property protection.  However, this tort 
is unknown in many jurisdictions, including England, and is very limited 
in its application in those in which it is recognised.  In most 
circumstances, the fruits of collaborative research will be protected, if at 
all, only by the statutory intellectual property codes.  Thus the fruits of a 
collaboration will be able to be captured if it constitutes, for example, an 
invention that can be patented; a work (including a computer 
programme) that is the subject of copyright protection; a database over 
which the database right can be asserted or a plant variety which can be 
protected by plant variety rights. 
A significant level of international harmonisation of the intellectual 
property codes has taken place in the last 150 years.  This occurred first 
under a series of multi-lateral international treaties that emerged in the 
19th century and has more recently come about under the Agreement on 
Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual property Rights including Trade in 
Counterfeited Goods (the so-called TRIPS Agreement).49  Nevertheless, the 
rules concerning the ownership of intellectual property are significantly 
different in different jurisdictions.  The discussion here will call attention 
to some interesting and important differences between the relevant 
bodies of law in several national jurisdictions, but the determination of 
which nation’s law is to govern, and what court will hear disputes when 
the latter involve international collaborators, again is a very complex 
matter that must remains beyond the bounds of this review. 
In the case of intellectual property disputes, the applicable law usually 
will be the law under which protection is sought, although the 
application of this principle is far from straightforward.  In relation to 
                                                        
49 The TRIPS Agreement is an appendix to the Marrakesh Agreement establishing the World Trade 
Organization (1994). 
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the forum in which such a dispute should be heard, Article 22(4) of 
Council Regulation (EC) 44/2001 of 22 December 2000 on jurisdiction and 
the recognition and enforcement of judgements in civil and commercial 
matters and equivalent common law rules, provide that questions 
concerning the registration or validity of an intellectual property right 
will be heard in the courts of the jurisdiction in which the intellectual 
property right is claimed.  So, for example, questions as to the validity or 
registration of a German patent will need to be heard in the 
Bundespatentgericht.  By contrast, however, the conflict of law rules of 
many countries, including those of the United Kingdom, provide that 
infringement actions can be heard in the courts of other jurisdictions, 
often those in which the defendant is domiciled.50  The context in which 
an alleged infringement takes place over the Internet raises even more 
uncertain questions of jurisdiction, particularly in light of the growing 
tendency of the courts, evinced in cases such as Menashe Business 
Mercantile Ltd v William Hill Organisation Ltd51 to claim jurisdiction over 
the infringement of intellectual property rights on the Internet involving 
activities that might be seen as taking place in another country.52  
Again, the question of conflict of laws presents a minefield for potential 
international collaborators who may find themselves either defending 
suits, or bringing suits to protect their intellectual property, in foreign 
jurisdictions and under foreign law.  This cannot be entirely avoided by 
carefully drafted contractual provisions as to the choice of law and 
choice of courts, but such provisions can significantly reduce the risks to 
a successful collaboration presented by the arcane rules as to the conflict 
of laws. 
The first issue to be addressed in determining whether the outcome of a 
collaborative project gives rise to intellectual property that can be owned 
is whether it falls within the subject matter requirements of the statutory 
regimes.  The most likely outcomes of such a project will be a patentable 
invention, a copyright computer programme or a database which might 
be the subject of either copyright or database right.  A consideration of 
the issue of the copyright and database protection of scientific databases 
will reveal something of the intricacy of this class of issues.  
                                                        
50 See Pearce v Ove Arup Partnership Ltd and Others [1997] 2 WLR 779. 
51 [2003] RPC 31. 
52 See Menashe Business Mercantile Ltd v William Hill Organisation Ltd [2003] RPC 31. 
Designing Institutional Infrastructures for e-Science 
 
113
Scientific and technical databases will be protected by copyright if they 
amount to original literary works.  Under section 3A(2) of the Copyright, 
Designs and Patents Act 1988, a database will constitute such a work only 
where ‘by reason of the selection or arrangement of the contents of the 
database the database constitutes the author’s own intellectual creation.’  
It is therefore the manner in which the database is organised that is 
protected by copyright rather than its contents.  There is academic 
debate about whether the standard of originality that must be met for 
copyright in a database is higher than that applied to literary works 
generally in relation to which is usually held that ‘original’ simply means 
‘not-copied’.53  In the implementation of the Software Directive (1991)54 
and the Term Directive (1993),55 the United Kingdom government seems 
to have assumed that it did not, as it was not thought necessary to 
amend the law of the United Kingdom so as to meet similar provisions 
defining originality.  By the time of the implementation of the Database 
Directive (1996)56 the government may have changed its position, as the 
Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988 was amended to include the same 
definition of originality for databases. 
In the United States, the arrangement of a database may also be 
protected by copyright, but again the standard of originality required for 
protection is uncertain.  The US Supreme Court’s ruling in the leading 
case, Feist Publications v Rural Telephone57 made it clear that originality must 
consist of more than mere effort in the compilation of information.  But 
inasmuch as the arrangement of the information in that particular case 
was alphabetical, it is difficult to determine just how much originality 
was required and whether the standard was significantly higher than that 
required in the United Kingdom.  The situation is clearer in the 
European Union, where a database might also attract the protection of a 
database right under the terms of the Database Directive, which was 
implemented in the United Kingdom as the Copyright and Rights in 
Databases Regulations 1997. 
                                                        
53 University of London Press v University Tutorial Press [1916] 2 Ch 601. 
54  Council Directive 91/250/EEC on the legal protection of computer programs, art 1(3). 
55  Council Directive 93/98/EEC harmonising the term of copyright protection, art 6. 
56  Directive 96/9/EC of the European Parliament on the legal protection of databases, art 3(1). 
57 111 SCt 1282 (1991). 
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This protection prevents not merely the reproduction of the selection or 
arrangement of a database, but the extraction or re-utilisation of a 
substantial part of the contents of the database.  In order for a database 
to qualify for this protection there must have been substantial 
investment in obtaining, verifying or presenting the contents of the 
database.  Copyright protection in the United Kingdom will be available 
to nationals of most countries.  By contrast, the Database right will be 
available only to nationals of the European Economic Area, although it 
will also be available to someone not from the European Economic 
Area who jointly makes the database with a person (or company) who is 
resident there.  Despite the inducement for reciprocal introduction 
outside the EU, which was seen to be the motivation for this departure 
from the ‘national treatment’ provisions familiar under the Berne 
Convention on copyright protection, attempts to introduce similar 
legislation in the United States have so far not met with success. 
A problem arises under the database right because of the content of 
many databases, and, indeed, most of the particularly valuable scientific 
and engineering databases are continually changing.  The UK Copyright 
and Databases Regulations 1997 provide that: 
17(3) Any substantial change to the contents of a database, 
including a substantial change resulting from the 
accumulation of successive additions, deletions or alterations, 
which would result in the database being considered to be a 
substantial new investment shall qualify the database resulting 
from that investment for its own term of protection. 
This paragraph was the subject of a reference to the European Court of 
Justice from the English Court of Appeal in the case C 203/02 British 
Horseracing Board Limited v William Hill Organisation Limited.58  In the court 
of first instance, Laddie J held that the Regulations were intended to 
protect dynamic databases that are constantly being updated.  He held 
that as a database is updated it is subject to a new term of protection on 
an on-going basis but that an unauthorised user who takes older data 
‘only faces a database right which runs from the date when all of that 
older data was present in the database at the same time.’  Moreover, if 
someone ‘takes an existing database and adds significantly to it, he 
                                                        
58 [2004] RPC 13. 
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obtains protection for the database incorporating his addition.’59  The 
European Court of Justice found that it did not have to address the 
correctness of this position, but at some point it will need to be 
addressed. 
It is clear that this legislation will be difficult to apply in many 
circumstances involving on-line scientific collaboration.  A database may 
be being constantly updated.  It may therefore be very difficult to 
determine either the point at which it has changed identity and its term 
of protection thereby extended or the point at which new rights in the 
database have been acquired by someone adding to it.  Good examples 
of such a database might be: (i) the Comb-e-Chem project in which 
results from an on-line test-bed in combinatorial chemistry are stored as 
a part of a database that is constantly being updated by each new user, or 
(ii) the GENIE project which creates a constantly updated database of 
results arising from the use of a Grid enabled integrated earth system 
model. 
The determination of the ownership of the knowledge resources arising 
from on-line collaborations is often far from simple.  Assuming that the 
outcomes of on-line scientific collaboration include subject matter that 
can be protected under the various statutory intellectual property codes, 
it then becomes a matter of determining who has ownership over that 
subject matter, either under the statutory regime itself or some legally 
effective agreement.  Most of those involved in on-line science will be 
working for a university or other research institution.  They may also be 
working in partnership with a private firm or with funding from a public 
or private body.  Importantly, they may well change employers during 
the life of a particular collaborative research project.  Disputes will 
inevitably arise as to the ownership of valuable knowledge resources 
between these different parties.  
The allocation of the first ownership of intellectual property varies 
slightly from jurisdiction to jurisdiction and from statutory regime to 
statutory regime.  In general terms, however, the law of the United 
Kingdom allocates first ownership to the creator of the particular 
resource or to her employer.  For these purposes, an employer is not 
simply someone who provides the funding for, or commissions, the 
                                                        
59 British Horseracing Board Limited v William Hill Organisation Limited [2001] RPC 31. 
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research.  Rather, it is someone with whom the creator is in a ‘master-
servant’ relationship.  In order for first ownership of the resource to be 
allocated to the employer, the material in question must be created in the 
course of employment.  In the field of inventions, the allocation of first 
ownership to the employer is somewhat offset by  section 40 of  the 
Patents Act 1977, which provides that an employee inventor can be 
remunerated in circumstances in which his or her invention proves to be 
of ‘outstanding benefit to her employer’.  But claims under this 
provision are rare. 
The application of all this law to the position of academics in the United 
Kingdom has been much debated.  For some while it was the received 
wisdom that copyright in works created during university employment 
first vested in the academic author, whereas rights to patentable 
inventions first vested in the university.60  In the wake of the decision in 
Greater Glasgow Health Board’s Application,61 however, it is now widely 
believed that rights to patentable inventions also will first vest in an 
academic inventor.  The continental European and American intellectual 
property regimes are even more complicated in the allocation of first 
ownership than are the rules in the United Kingdom; and some 
countries, such as Germany and Sweden have special rules that apply to 
university employees.  
In all jurisdictions, these rules as to first ownership become even more 
complicated in situations of collaborative creation.  This is particularly 
difficult for international collaborations because the rules as to joint 
creation vary more from jurisdiction to jurisdiction than do some other 
types of intellectual property rules.  Take, for example, the rules as to 
copyright.  In the United Kingdom, copyright will be jointly owned if 
the contribution of one author is not distinct from that of the others 
under section 10(1) of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988.  In 
Germany, however, there is a requirement of joint creation and a 
requirement that each of the parts is incapable of independent 
exploitation, but it is acceptable that the different parts of the jointly 
created programme have been made at different times.62  In the United 
                                                        
60  See W R Cornish, ‘Right in University Innovations: The Herchel Smith Lecture for 1991’ 
(1992) 13 EIPR 15–16. 
61 [1996] RPC 207. 
62 Buchaltungsprogramm BGH I ZR 47/91 (1995).  
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States, US Copyright Act §101 provides that the intention of the authors 
as to whether their work will be merged into inseparable or 
interdependent parts of a unitary whole will be determinative.  In 
practice some jurisdictions, such as the United States, have a tendency to 
categorise works as jointly created, and therefore have very fully 
articulated rules as to the way in which different authors must deal with 
one another and with strangers; whereas other jurisdictions, such as the 
United Kingdom, have far less developed law as to joint authorship 
because they are less likely to categorise works as jointly authored.  Thus 
a song is likely to be treated as a single copyright work in the US, even 
though one person has written its words and another its music; whereas 
in the UK the same material would be treated as independent literary 
and musical works.  Particular problems of joint ownership arise when a 
party brings to a collaboration material to which either copyrights or 
database rights may already apply – especially when the ownership status 
is not clearly known ex ante.   
At least in the United Kingdom, it is difficult to predict whether in such 
circumstances the courts would ever be prepared to treat the whole 
resulting outcome as the subject of a new proprietary right that is jointly 
owned, or simply regard the resulting product to be a composite of 
different items of protected subject matter.  In most circumstances it is 
likely that the latter result would prevail, but this may not always be the 
case.  For example, under section 17(3) of the Copyright and Databases 
Regulations 1997 it is plausible that a new, jointly owned database can be 
made out of two existing databases.  The distinction between these two 
interpretations might become important when a researcher changes 
institutions.  If the first employer has rights to the database that she 
creates in one place and she takes that database and adds to it in the new 
institution, the different analyses suggested here will determine whether 
the original university has any claim to rights in the whole of the 
resultant resource or simply in those parts of it which the researcher 
took with her when she left her first employment.63  
While the rules as to the first vesting of intellectual property rights in 
jointly created resources are very intricate, it is important also to note 
                                                        
63 For a cautionary tale regarding the institutionally mobile author of a scientific database, see 
David and Spence (2003/2004): Appendix 5 (The Effect of Uncertainty as to Ownership: A 
Cautionary Tale - The Attwood Experience of Database Ownership).  
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that express agreement, or the assignment of rights can in most 
jurisdictions displace the effect of all these rules as to first ownership.  
The issue upon which to focus then becomes that of the terms of the 
contractual arrangements between the individual members of a 
collaborative project and their employer institutions and funding bodies.  
The Association of University Teachers in the United Kingdom has 
recently conducted a survey of policies concerning the first ownership of 
intellectual property amongst university employers in this country and 
has found significantly divergent practices.64  This policy diverges even 
more widely amongst universities internationally, although the trend in 
recent years, not surprisingly, has been for universities to claim more and 
more.  When outside parties get involved they too may have their own 
requirements as to the assignment of intellectual property rights.  
Because the funding arrangements will vary depending upon the type of 
project, it is difficult to generalise about arrangements for the allocation 
of rights. 
It seems clear, however, that distributive norms need to be established in 
relation to the ‘proper’ allocation of rights among researchers for 
projects of different kinds.  These norms also should be flexible enough 
to respond to situations in which the identities of the parties involved in 
a collaboration, or their employers, have altered.  This is again a situation 
in which widely shared principles and standard contractual clauses, 
interpreted by competent fora, could be used to reduce the uncertainties 
surrounding the establishment of collaborative projects.  The difficulty 
in addressing this need is that without the assistance of an institutional 
mechanism for the efficient resolution of these issues at the outset of the 
collaborative undertaking, subsequently emerging disputes over the 
‘knowledge assets’ that have been created may make it difficult for the 
latter to be used effectively, thereby defeating the purposes of e-Science. 
2.3.4  Issues of Liability Arising from Collaboration 
Most thinking about on-line collaboration has focused upon questions 
of ownership, either of the inputs to a collaboration or of the knowledge 
resources to which it gives rise.  An equally important issue, however, is 
that of professional responsibility for the conduct of a project and 
                                                        
64 This is available in the Members Only section of the web site <http://www.aut.org.uk>.  
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liability for any harm that it might cause.  These are linked, but not 
identical, questions. 
The question of professional responsibility is that of who will bear the 
reputational or other loss associated with the discovery that research has 
been conducted either incompetently or unethically.  The scientific 
community has traditional norms controlling the damage caused by 
incompetent work or unethical behaviour, such as the falsification of 
research results.  More recently those norms have been given effect 
formally through the policies of universities, funding bodies and 
journals, but they also are enforced informally through the shared 
understandings about the subsequent treatment of malefactors by 
colleagues, especially those involved in the same branch of scientific 
enquiry.  In general terms, norms of professional responsibility 
traditionally have reflected, and should reflect, the structure of norms 
for the assignment of credit for the project’s scientific achievements.  
That is, the senior scientist with responsibility for directing the work of 
the project (or the facility whose resources it uses) gets most credit when 
it is a success, and corresponding also ought to be the person whose 
reputation suffers most harm if the research is found to have been 
poorly conducted, or the findings have been misreported.  
Parallel to this question of professional responsibility, there exist legal 
rules that determine legal responsibility for harm that a project may 
cause.  These legal rules may well attribute responsibility in a way that is 
different to that in which the traditional norms of the scientific 
community would do.  Moreover, questions of liability might arise even 
for parties who do not engage in e-Science collaboration themselves, but 
merely provide the platform for others to do so, such as DiscoveryNet 
or myGrid.  In England, the law of tort often will determine the 
question of whether, and how, harm caused by a collaborative project 
ought to be compensated.  This will be the case whether the relevant 
harm has been suffered by one of the parties to a project or by a third 
party.  In broad terms, the question will frequently become one of 
whether the behaviour which has given rise to a particular harm was 
negligent in that the harm was reasonably foreseeable and could have 
been prevented.  For example, the rapid spread of a new virus through a 
computer system (causing losses of data, or damage to instruments 
controlled by that system) may be deemed to have been impossible to 
guard against, whereas the failure to update available anti-virus filters in 
Legal Framework for e-Research: Realising the Potential 
 
120 
a system firewall could be more readily construed as negligence.  
Negligence, and indeed the law of tort, is far from the only potential 
sources of liability to which the participants in collaborations may be 
exposed.  For example, parties also might be liable because the project 
uses or creates material that is in breach of some intellectual property 
right, or because confidential data is accidentally disclosed, violating the 
privacy of outside parties. 
Collaborative projects give rise to a host of potential questions of 
liability.  As is the case with issues of responsibility for the legality of 
inputs to a research project, the issue of responsibility for the conduct of 
research and its outcome needs to be addressed by the parties to a 
collaborative project before it is launched.  The lawyer’s solution is likely 
to be a combination of indemnities and insurance for the most obvious 
risks, but this again raises the various costs of negotiating an e-Science 
collaboration.  Once more the discussion has moved into an area of 
concern where it would be most helpful to promote the articulation of 
common principles for collaboration which reflected the traditional 
norms for the allocation of responsibility in the scientific community, 
and where the development of standard form contractual clauses 
consistent with those principles clearly would be recognised as desirable. 
The purpose of the foregoing review has not been to offer an exhaustive 
list of the legal issues that will arise in the context of e-Science 
collaborations.  Rather, it is intended to point to the range and 
complexity of the issues that are likely to arise.  It is clear that these 
issues cannot be addressed in a single programme of ‘law reform’.  
Equipping the scientific community to deal with the complexities of the 
institutional environments in which they work demands a more subtle 
and responsive institutional design of the kind that is outlined by the 
next Part.  
3.  A PROPOSED INSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT 
PROCESS FOR e-SCIENCE 
To devise one or several approaches for arriving at institutional 
mechanisms whose establishment would generate workable specific 
arrangements that facilitated collaboration in e-Science is a considerable 
challenge.  The multiple parties and jurisdictions involved in e-Science 
collaborations, and the need to balance conflicting interests among 
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them, make the design of effective governance arrangements an 
extremely complicated and thorny problem.  The costs of getting those 
arrangements even slightly wrong can be very high.65  Furthermore, 
most research scientists have socially more productive things to do than 
spend their time thinking about how to arrive at a good set of 
governance mechanisms, even though it would be impossible for others 
to achieve that goal without thoroughly involving the affected research 
communities in the process.  More difficult still will be the task of 
obtaining quickly negotiated contractual arrangements that also could be 
of use to facilitate collaborative activities in other spheres where Grid 
infrastructure is likely to be extended – including e-Learning, e-
Government, e-Commerce, e-Healthcare. 
It is clear that these appropriate institutional mechanisms cannot simply 
be put into place by legislation and that the problems created by the 
international nature of collaborative e-Science cannot be solved by the 
international harmonisation of formal legal rules.  Legislation and the 
harmonisation of legal rules have a potentially stultifying effect on the 
development of appropriate institutional mechanisms in this area.  When 
legislation is enacted and international conventions are agreed, they tend 
to have the effect of petrifying the norms regulating a given area of 
behaviour for a long period.  This poses the risks that the norms which 
have been set may have been set at a particular point in the development 
of a social practice, such as on-line scientific collaboration, and may 
rapidly become inappropriate.  The history of the international 
agreements on the protection of semiconductor topographies provides a 
good illustration of the need to proceed in a way that can avoid this 
potential danger. 
3.1 Creating an Appropriate Institutional Mechanism: Basic 
Considerations 
Any standardisation of the norms that govern e-Science must be 
sufficiently flexible to undergo non-disruptive evolution with the 
development of mode of organising and conducting research that is, 
after all, still in its infancy.  Moreover, the international harmonisation of 
legal rules is unlikely to be effective.  The international harmonisation of 
                                                        
65 See David and Spence (2003/2004): Appendix 6 (The Effect of Inappropriate Licensing: A 
Cautionary Tale-The SWISSPROT Experience of Database Licensing). 
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law is a slow and frustrating process as the TRIPS negotiators have 
found.  Harmonisation would be a particularly daunting task given the 
range of legal issues that might impact upon the conduct of collaborative 
on-line research.  Moreover, the harmonisation of legal norms is only 
ever partially effective in achieving the goal that disputes determined 
under the same norms will find the same result in different courts.  The 
history, for example, of the European Patent Convention shows that the 
same norms can lead to different outcomes in different courts with 
different interpretative traditions.  Formal law reform and the 
harmonisation of laws do not seem to be the answer to establishing 
norms that can facilitate collaborative e-Science.66 
Consequently, the nub of this chapter’s recommended approach to 
constructing appropriate institutional infrastructures for e-Science is the 
creation of a co-ordinating and facilitating mechanism, in the shape of a 
novel public agency.  We envisage the establishment of an independent 
body that could be formally designated as the ‘Advisory Board on 
Collaboration Agreements’ (ABCA).  Its remit would be to guide, 
oversee and disseminate the work of producing, maintaining, evaluating 
and updating standard contractual clauses, those being the constituent 
elements from which formal agreements may be more readily fashioned 
by the parties undertaking specific ‘Grid-enabled’ collaborations in 
science and engineering research.  This advisory board would, of 
necessity, play a leading role in enunciating a set of fundamental 
principles to guide the formulation of those contractual clauses and 
ensure that the effects of the agreements into which they are introduced 
will not be inconsistent with the intent underlying those principles.  
In view of the importance of finding some suitable response to the 
needs that have been described by the preceding discussion, some new 
institutional departures along these lines appears very much in order.  
That appropriate institutional mechanisms can make a critical 
                                                        
66 This legal approach is neutral with regard to the balance struck in such agreements between 
providing for commercial exploitation of intellectual property rights and protecting the public 
domain in scientific and technical data and information.  One should note, however, that it can 
accommodate the thrust of recent proposals that address the latter concern, most notably, J H 
Reichman and P F Uhlir, ‘A Contractually Reconstructed Research Commons for Scientific 
Data in a Highly Protectionist Intellectual Property Environment’ (Winter/Spring 2003) 66 Law 
and Contemporary Problems 315–462, forthcoming.  Explicit recommendations favouring such an 
approach are advanced below, in Part 4.   
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contribution to the success of the United Kingdom’s investments in e-
Science seems beyond serious dispute.  There is no point in investing in 
new technologies to facilitate and empower complex collaborations if at 
the same time we are imposing rules and regulations (including legal and 
institutional administrative arrangements) that excessively raise the costs 
of actually carrying out those sorts of collaborations.  So we need non-
technological governance mechanisms (of which institutional regulations 
and legally sanctioned contractual forms constitute important examples, 
but not the only ones) whose effects tend to reinforce, rather than to 
counteract, those of the technological infrastructure of e-Science.  To 
initiate a deliberate movement towards this goal, this section of the 
chapter proposes the launching of an exploratory process of institutional 
learning.  It identifies the types of expertise that should be engaged, and 
the forms in which it could be mobilised by the United Kingdom 
agencies that would fund the suggested programme of consultative 
research and institutional experimentation. 
3.2  An Independent ‘Public Actor’ – The Proposed 
Mechanism and Some Existing Models 
What is needed is the establishment of a new ‘public actor’, a separate 
agency with on-going powers to initiate, co-ordinate and provide 
resources required to support and, above all, articulate principles for 
developing an array of model contractual clauses.  Each of these clauses 
would address a particular problem among the myriad of legal issues that 
have been seen to arise from the formation of research collaborations, 
and variant solutions would be provided by the clauses developed under 
each topical heading.  Much of this detailed work could be entrusted to 
specialised task force-like committees – possibly resembling the many 
‘study committees’ set up under one or another of the US National 
Research Council Boards. 
The activities of the study committees organised under the auspices of 
what we here call ‘the ABCA’ would focus upon framing appropriate 
standard contractual clauses that could be readily assembled into a 
variety of alternative collaboration agreements, much in the same way 
that software sub-routines and modules can be assembled into 
functionally more comprehensive software systems that are suited for 
particular applied tasks.  As part of its supervisory and co-ordinating 
role, the ABCA would have not only to think about the underlying 
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principles that will be implemented through the contractual clauses of 
those agreements.  It would also need to determine the best ways of 
organising the accumulation and dissemination of information and 
analyses concerning the actual formulations and manner of 
implementation of contractual agreements.  These principles for the 
establishment of e-Science collaborations and model contractual clauses 
could then be put into effect in individual cases by universities and 
research bodies. 
The part of the ABCA’s activities which involved promoting principles 
of best practice in establishing institutional arrangements for e-Science 
collaborations might find a parallel in the work of the Basel Committee 
on Banking Supervision.67  Under the Basel Accord the Governors of 
the Central Banks of thirteen countries develop common principles for 
banking supervision.  The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision 
does not make laws of any kind, rather it builds consensus between 
important actors in the international banking community and these 
standards are given appropriate effect by relevant actors in local 
contexts.  The experience of the banking community has been that this 
approach has the advantage of flexibility and that principles develop 
slowly rather than being imposed at what might be an inappropriate 
stage in their articulation.  In time, it might be hoped that an 
international body for the development of collaborative research 
principles might be established, similar to the Basel Committee.  
However, the establishment of a national body with such a task would 
be an important step in establishing socially desirable rules for the 
organisation of e-Science at a national level.  Indeed, it is likely that a 
United Kingdom body charged with the functions of the ABCA could 
set a lead in the organisation of e-Science collaborations and that its 
principles and contractual clauses would be widely adopted even by 
those not a part, either direct or indirect, of the United Kingdom e-
Science network. 
The part of the ABCA’s work that involved the development of 
standard contractual clauses might also find a parallel in the work of the 
                                                        
67 The Basel Committee is briefly considered as a model in the context of e-Commerce 
regulation in D Casey and J Magenau ‘A Hybrid model of Self-Regulation and Governmental 
Regulation of Electronic Commerce’ (2002) 19 Santa Clara Computer & High Technology Law 
Journal 1, 27. 
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Basel Committee and, with one important reservation, in that of the 
Grain and Feed Association (‘GAFTA’).  The Basel Committee makes 
recommendations for contractual clauses in certain areas of banking 
practice as a means of ensuring that the principles it articulates are given 
appropriate and certain effect.  Central amongst the clauses that the 
ABCA might be expected to suggest would be those reflecting a 
consensus as to the appropriate fora for the resolution of disputes under 
e-Science collaboration agreements, particularly those involving parties 
from different jurisdictions.  A model of how such choice of forum 
clauses might operate can be found in the standard form agreements 
established and maintained by GAFTA.  GAFTA has 80 different 
standard contracts under which more than 80 million tonnes of the 
world’s trade in cereals and 70% of trade in animal feeds moves 
annually.  These contracts contain arbitration clauses that allow parties 
to make use of the GAFTA Dispute Resolution Service.  This service 
provides for the speedy and final resolution of disputes in an expert 
forum that is cheaper and quicker than traditional legal systems; further, 
it has the advantage of being outside the legal system of any of the 
parties to the international collaboration.  The process involves a 
possible appeal to a GAFTA appeal board.  Awards given under the 
arbitration system are enforced either informally through publication of 
the fact that a party has failed to comply with an agreement or, as a last 
resource, through the court system of the jurisdiction in which the party 
against whom the award has been made under the New York Convention 
on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards 1958.  In the 
event that arbitration fails for some reason, disputes in international 
commodities contracts of this type are by agreement usually referred to 
the courts of a small number of jurisdictions, in particular those of 
England and New York.  The establishment of standard arrangements 
for the resolution of disputes in transnational e-Science collaborations 
would greatly reduce the uncertainty surrounding such projects.68  It is 
important at this point to emphasise why the approach recommended is 
one of standard contractual clauses and principles for the development 
of collaboration agreements rather than standard form agreements of the 
                                                        
68 Yet another parallel might be found in the highly effective matrix of formal and informal 
norms that regulate the international trade in cotton under the rules of the Liverpool Cotton 
Association, see L Bernstein, ‘Private Commercial Law in the Cotton Industry: creating 
Cooperation Through Rules, Norms and Institutions’ (2001) 99 Michigan Law Review 1724. 
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type established and maintained by GAFTA.  This is for three reasons. 
Firstly, the potential contexts of e-Science collaborations are very 
various and the formulation of standard form agreements would be an 
almost impossible task.  Even GAFTA must maintain 80 agreements in 
relation to the relatively routine transactions that make up the 
international trade in grain and animal feeds.  The contexts in which 
standard form contracts tend to be most successful are those such as 
domestic conveyancing in which only a very limited range of issues is 
likely to arise. 
Secondly, the introduction of standard form agreements, like legislation 
and the harmonisation of laws, may have the danger of petrifying norms 
at an inappropriate stage in their articulation.  We are at the beginning of 
a new era of scientific collaboration, based upon high bandwidth 
telecommunications and grid-enabled computing, and to put standard 
form agreements in place at this moment may entail the danger of 
ossifying the development not only of appropriate norms for e-Science, 
but also of inhibiting flexibility in the elaboration of the enabling 
technological infrastructure.  The absence of extensive experience (and 
hence of the weight of precedents) concerning arrangements in the new 
environment creates an opportunity to exercise greater leverage over the 
future evolution by setting standards early and firmly.69  Yet, the very 
same conditions make it difficult to gauge what the new standards 
should be. 
The fact that principles, more obviously than standard form agreements, 
must be developed over time will serve to emphasise to the community 
of lawyers and administrators in academic institutions and funding 
bodies that the agreements they produce need to reflect changing 
scientific practice.  
                                                        
69 This is the non-technical form of the classic problem of ‘anticipatory standard-setting’ in 
regard to network interoperability standards, sometimes referred to as ‘the Blind Giant’s 
problem’.  See P A David, ‘Some New Standards for the Economics of Standardization in the 
Information Age’ in P Dasgupta and P L Stoneman (eds), Economics and Technological Performance 
(1987) 206–39; P A David, ‘Standardization Policies for Network Technologies: The Flux 
Between Freedom and Order Revisited’  in  R Hawkins, R Mansell and J Skea (eds), Standards, 
Innovation and Competitiveness: The Political Economy of Standards in Natural and Technological 
Environments (1995) 15–35; P A David and M Shurmer, ‘Formal Standards-Setting for Global 
Telecommunication and Information Services’ (December 1996) 20(10) Telecommunications Policy 
789–815. 
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Thirdly, the blanket use of standard form agreements is fraught with 
legal risk.  This is because such agreements can come to be used without 
appropriate legal advice and institutional support.  Indeed, this is more 
likely in the context of e-Science than it is in context of international 
trade.  Three particular legal problems tend to emerge when standard 
form agreements are used without appropriate professional advice.  In 
the first place, it is obvious that a standard form agreement may not be 
appropriately adapted to the project which it is intended to govern.  
Second, in situations in which the parties simply adopt a standard form 
without addressing their minds to the appropriateness of its terms, the 
courts and legislators in most jurisdictions have come to regard them as 
inherently suspect.  This is because contractual liability is generally, 
though not universally, regarded as essentially consensual.  In the case of 
a standard form agreement, it is sometimes difficult to see how at least 
one of the parties can be taken to have consented to all its terms.  The 
issue of how consent can be given to standard form agreements on-line 
has been thought to give rise to particular problems that have attracted 
both legislative and academic attention around the world.  Third, when 
different standard forms are used by the parties entering a particular 
transaction, each can purport to rely upon her own usual form; it then 
may be difficult to determine which, if indeed either of the two had 
ultimately been adopted as the basis of the agreement.  This is 
sometimes referred to as the ‘battle of forms’ and will become a problem 
as ‘form shopping’ encourages a proliferation of standard form 
agreements. 
It is therefore suggested that the approach of developing standard 
contractual clauses covering most of the issues likely to arise in 
establishing and conducting an e-Science project, together with 
principles for their use to be observed by lawyers and administrators in 
academic institutions and funding bodies is a better way of developing 
this area of law than the development of even a stable of alternative 
standard form contracts.  What is called for, in effect, is the 
institutionalisation of an iterative, adaptive procedure for developing 
‘meta-agreements’ – contractual analogues of ‘meta-standards’ in the 
technological domain.  This way of navigating the legal thicket can be 
likened to a technological meta-standards approach based upon setting 
‘performance standards’ rather than technical specifications, which has 
long been advocated as most appropriate for anticipatory technical 
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standards development purposes.  (In the latter, almost as a matter of 
definition, the relevant underlying technology and the markets are 
evolving rapidly; this means that very substantial uncertainty surrounds 
the capabilities of new systems and the attributes that their users will 
most value.) 
Setting performance standards, however, implies that criteria of 
acceptability must be defined in the relevant dimensions, and procedures 
for compliance testing and certification need to be established.  
Although those sometimes are held to be impracticably costly 
requirements to impose in the technological sphere, an analogous 
process would appear to be considerably less problematic (indeed, quite 
natural) when applied in the domain of contractual clauses.  The 
apparatus already exists for the effects of the latter to be examined by 
reference to expert opinion about pertinent legal doctrine, the empirical 
experience of contractual negotiations, and the law courts’ rulings in a 
variety of jurisdictions. 
In summary, therefore, three key conditions seem necessary for the 
ABCA to be effective in its undertakings.  First it is necessary that it 
delineate readily intelligible transcendent principles for agreements 
governing collaborative e-Science projects – across as wide a variety of 
academic research domains as is possible.  Second, to be workable and 
substantially self-enforcing, these guiding principles also must reflect the 
essential values of the scientific communities whose collaborative work 
is to be facilitated by institutional instruments (and the technological 
infrastructures of Grid-enabled computing).  Third, in order to yield 
contractual agreements that are flexible enough to accommodate 
distinctive features of the relevant research community norms, as well as 
of the requirements of the particular science that is being planned in 
each case, the ABCA should eschew trying to write ‘model contract’ or 
‘standard form’ agreements, and focus instead upon the development of 
standard contractual clauses.  
3.3  Organisational Form and Composition of ‘The ABCA’ 
The precise form of the responsible independent body thus envisaged 
can best be left for discussion and subsequent determination, once there 
is substantial agreement about its goals and operating procedures.  One 
approach deserving serious consideration would be to have the 
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proposed advisory board on collaboration agreements would 
independently from, but in close liaison with bodies representing the 
pertinent administrative agencies – including the office of the Director 
of the Research Councils, the Higher Education Funding Council for 
England (HEFCE), the Scottish Funding Councils for Further and 
Higher Education, Universities UK (UUK) and the Standing Committee 
of Principals (SCOP).  
Alternatively, the establishment of the ABCA could be approached more 
gradually, by organising a continuing ‘Working Party on Agreements’ 
which reported regularly to the Joint Information Systems Committee 
(JISC-WPA).  Once a body of contractual clauses and information about 
the circumstances in which they proved most suitable had been 
developed, the Working Party might be dissolved and replaced by the 
ABCA envisaged above.  Eventually, as its recommended contractual 
clauses came to be more widely used for publicly funded collaborative 
projects in e-Science, the ABCA might eventually be transformed into a 
completely free-standing and permanent official government 
‘Commission on Institutional Infrastructures for Collaborations in e-
Science’ (CIIC:e-Science).  The colon in the latter looks ahead to the 
formation of a succession of such commissions, each having analogous 
responsibilities for assisting the formation of collaborative agreements in 
a different sphere, e.g., e-Commerce.  
The composition of the ABCA’s appointed study committees, like the 
membership of that body itself, would have to be multidisciplinary.  The 
working groups particularly need to draw upon technical expertise 
regarding the hardware and software infrastructures supporting 
collaborative e-Science, and the complex systems of resource allocation 
of which scientific and technological research and teaching is a part.  
Moreover, through the guidelines provided by the ABCA as part of the 
committee’s remit, it must be attentive to the larger societal goals and 
values that HEIs and public research institutes need to serve.  The e-
Science Board’s members also need to stay informed and especially 
foresighted regarding potential opportunities and challenges that are 
likely emerge when the technological infrastructures created for e-
Science are opened for the development of applications supporting e-
Learning, e-Commerce, e-Government, and so on.  
In embarking on what must be an evolutionary programme of research, 
practical experimentation, assessment and redesign, it will be vital to 
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enlist the assistance of lawyers (both academic and practising) who are 
well versed in the array of legal issues identified by this chapter – and 
with their treatment not only in common law, but under other legal 
systems.  No less important for this work will be the recruiting of a core 
cadre of social scientists who have been involved in science and 
technology policy studies in the United Kingdom and other leading 
research countries.  They should have particular expertise in the social 
and economic organisation of academic research communities, as well as 
with corporate research management practices and policies regarding 
intellectual property rights.  They should be complemented by rotating 
groups of experienced practitioners drawn from two constituencies: 
senior scientists familiar with the variety of research communities that 
are likely to take the lead in moving their activities onto e-Science 
platforms, and representatives of university administrations who are 
engaged in solving the practical problems posed by research 
collaborations. 
3.4  Requirements for Information on the Experiences of e-
Science Collaborations 
The development of a clearer picture of the institutional context of 
collaborative e-Science therefore can be viewed as one of the derivative 
implications of the recommendations advanced by this chapter.  
Evidently, this entire proposed programme of legal mechanism design 
will need to be informed by systematic data collection about the 
informal ways in which disputes among collaborating researchers, and 
among institutional partners too, actually may be resolved before the 
parties enter litigation.  Corresponding research is necessary about the 
circumstances in which scientific and technological projects are most 
frequently delayed, or irremediably disrupted by conflicts involving 
contractual matters.  A multidisciplinary inquiry into the role played by 
institutional infrastructure factors in the experience of successful (and 
unsuccessful) e-Science collaborations should be initiated in conjunction 
with the assessment work that the ABCA should plan to carry out in 
regard to the effects of its own work. 
The discussion (in section 2.1, above) of the current institutional context 
of scientific collaboration brought out the comparative paucity of 
concrete empirical knowledge concerning the specifics of current 
individual researchers’ experiences with informal governance 
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arrangements for scientific research collaborations, and a parallel lack of 
systematic information about the ways that formal legal rules are being 
utilised by co-operating institutions.  As this kind of information that 
could be gathered is a part of the process recommended by this chapter 
it is appropriate to take fuller note of this requirement; and equally of 
the opportunities that would thereby be opened for social science and 
legal studies of the changes occurring in the social and economic 
organisation of contemporary science and engineering research.  
First, more information is needed about current practices in planning the 
institutional structures of e-Science collaborations.  In particular, it is 
important to know the extent to which the working scientists themselves 
have an input into planning the institutional aspects of those projects, 
rather than simply specifying the technical requirements.  If they only, or 
even principally, address the technical questions, there is a risk that 
planning will be on the basis of a ‘perfect team’ assumption – with issues 
of imperfect team behaviour therefore being left unaddressed.  Further, 
if the actual collaborating agents have little or no role in planning the 
institutional arrangements, there is the real danger that those 
arrangements will reflect choices that are at odds with the culture of 
collaborative research and inimical to its success. 
A further question regarding the planning phase of collaborative work is 
the issue of how, and from whom, the parties to collaborations, 
particularly those in publicly funded institutions, receive legal advice.  
Work needs to be done to discover the extent to which this advice is 
enabling, and the ways in which it creates possibilities for the 
establishment of individual collaborative projects, rather than simply 
imposes costs upon them.  Empirical studies should be directed to 
document the extent to which existing collaborations can and do 
support their institutional arrangements by implementing technical 
controls upon access, modification and reproduction of data and 
information.  It is as yet quite unclear the extent to which parties to 
scientific collaborations in academic institutions are using technical 
measures to monitor and enforce compliance of members with the rules 
of participation in a project, although employment of such devices by 
commercial database providers is well documented.  Finally, under this 
head, it is important to learn whether the rules for the administration of 
a particular collaboration are simply agreed rules of behaviour, or 
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whether they are built into the very way in which the project is 
structured. 
Second, more needs to be known about the way in which the 
participants in e-Science collaborations currently use the legal rules that 
touch upon their projects.  This involves a number of issues.  For 
example, when a dispute between collaborators arises, in what way do 
collaborators invoke the traditional informal norms of their particular 
scientific community and in what ways do they invoke formal legal rules?  
Evidence from contractual disputes in the commercial world suggests 
that formal rules are invoked only rarely, and when they are, it occurs at 
a point where the relationship among the parties already has become 
very strained.70  It is important to know whether this pattern also holds 
true in the world of collaborative e-Science.  Similarly, there is a question 
regarding the extent to which collaborators allow their relationships to 
develop as they proceed and the formality or informality with which they 
vary the agreements supporting their dealings with one another.  The 
experience of commercial lawyers is that even parties with access to 
sophisticated legal advice can allow a significant divergence to emerge 
between the formal legal basis of their relationship and the rules upon 
which it actually operates.  This can have unfortunate legal 
consequences, but it would be surprising if it were not the case in 
collaborative science. 
More generally, there is a need to learn much more than presently is 
known about the interplay among the technical, social and institutional 
constraints on e-Science.  For one thing, such studies would be of great 
help in validating a number of the assumptions underpinning the 
analysis and recommendations of this chapter, and could be expected to 
contribute significantly to the future design of institutional arrangements 
that would more effectively promote ‘e-collaborations’.  The sort of 
advisory body whose creation has been recommended here could be 
charged with the responsibility not only to propose effective legal 
devices and organisational procedures to facilitate collaborative e-
Science, but also to commission on-going social science research that 
should underlie its work. 
                                                        
70 And quite often, not even then.  In many instances formal legal action is initiated only when 
one of the parties reaches a ‘threat point’ imposed by the potential for third party action (eg 
shareholder lawsuits or bankruptcy proceedings). 
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4.  CONCLUSION: IPR POLICY REFORMS AND THE 
WAY FORWARD  
In setting out the scope of the challenge of providing workable 
institutional conditions for productive e-Science, and in proposing a 
particular approach towards that goal, the preceding parts of this chapter 
have avoided explicit discussion of the underlying policy positions that 
might be reflected in the ‘working principles’ adopted the proposed 
Advisory Board.  It has been noted, of course, that these would have to 
achieve some balance between, on the one side, the purposes of the 
scientists and engineers engaged in the research, and, on the other side, 
the corporate concerns of the institutions in which they were working.  
That the public and private non-profit funding agencies also will bring a 
further array of policy goals to bear – both directly and indirectly – on 
the determination of the ABCA’s operating principles is to be expected.  
In that context, it is only realistic to acknowledge that policy questions 
about intellectual property rights protections are likely to emerge among 
those that prove to be most problematic for the participants in research 
collaborations that receive substantial non-commercial (public sector 
and charitable foundation) support.  This Part therefore offers some 
concluding observations on the issues raised in that connection, and the 
way in which they might best be resolved through the agency of the 
Advisory Board.  
By emphasising the need to devise a new, flexible process for the 
‘bottom up’ construction of institutional arrangements that will promote 
and support collaborative e-Science research, priority has already been 
accorded here to the public sector goal of rapidly and efficiently 
advancing scientific and technological knowledge.  This position may be 
contrasted with according priority to the goal of capturing ‘private’ 
economic benefits from possession of new additions to the body of 
knowledge.  The approach accordingly is to be favoured over efforts to 
codify existing institutional agreements for publicly funded research in 
standard form contractual agreements - especially those which would 
simply carry over into the academic institutional sphere intellectual 
property rights provisions modelled on the legal agreements governing 
commercial R&D partnerships, research joint ventures and similar 
consortium arrangements.  The arguments for the latter position thus 
goes well beyond the point that standard form agreements may or may 
not strike the right balance between access and incentive in certain types 
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of scientific endeavour.  A still much more serious problem lies in the 
present imbalance that has appeared within the intellectual property 
regime - between the extent and strength of the protection being 
accorded to holders of private (monopoly) rights, and societal protection 
of the public domain or a protected ‘research commons’ in scientific and 
technical data and information.   
4.1 Preserving the Effectiveness of ‘Open Science’ 
There is today a growing consensus among informed observers that the 
dominant trend of the past two decades towards broadening and 
strengthening of legal protections for intellectual property rights, and the 
privatising of the sources of scientific and technical data and 
information, has now gone too far.  This assessment pertains to the 
situation existing among the handful of rich, economically advanced 
countries that do most of the world’s organised science and engineering 
research.  It is by no means confined to concerns that also have been 
expressed about the adverse impacts of the global IPR regime upon the 
developing economies’ access to new scientific knowledge and 
knowledge-intensive goods and services.71   
In Britain, the European Union and the US, several influential 
organisations have issued statements calling for a re-consideration of the 
place of intellectual property rights in contemporary science and 
technology.  They point to a number of unintended, yet nonetheless 
undesirable impacts of current intellectual property policies upon the 
effective conduct publicly funded, academic research collaborations in 
science and engineering.72  Especially notable in this regard are the Royal 
                                                        
71 On the latter, however, see Integrating Intellectual Property Rights and Development Policy, The 
Report of the Commission on Intellectual Property Rights ( 2nd ed, 2002) esp Ch 1, 5–7 
<http://www.iprcommission.org/papers/word/final_report/reportwordfinal.doc>. 
72 The same theme is emerging more strongly in the recent writings of academic lawyers and 
economists in the US. See, for example, James Boyle (ed), ‘The Public Domain’ (Winter/Spring 
2003) 66 (1 and 2) Law and Contemporary Problems (Special Issue of the Collected Papers from the 
Duke University Conference, held November 2001); Arti K Rais and Rebecca S Eisenberg, 
‘Bayh-Dole Reform and the Progress of Biomedicine’ (2003) 66(1) Law and Contemporary 
Problems <http://ssrn.com/abstract –id=348343>; P A David, ‘Can ‘Open Science’ be 
Protected from the Evolving Regime of Intellectual Property Protections’ (Fall 2003) Journal of 
Institutional and Theoretical Economics, forthcoming (Discussion Paper 02–29, Stanford Institute 
for Economic Policy Research, Stanford University, (July 2003) 
<http://siepr.stanford.edu/papers/papersauth_D-H.html>).  
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Society’s report entitled ‘Keeping Science Open’: The Effects of Intellectual 
Property Policy on the Conduct of Science (April 2003), and the Report of the 
EC Research Directorate General’s European Research Area Expert 
Group on Strategic Use and Adaptation of Intellectual Property Rights Systems in 
Information and Communications Technologies-based Research (March 2003).  
These same concerns also permeate the US National Academy of 
Sciences recent publication: The Role of the Public Domain in Scientific and 
Technical Data and Information: Proceedings of a Symposium (September 2003). 
None of these assessments are one-sided; all acknowledge that the 
protection of intellectual property rights can stimulate useful discoveries 
and inventions by protecting creative work and investments in costly 
research and development efforts.  Further, they recognise that the 
prospective award of monopoly rights in the exploitation of new ideas 
can elicit the disclosure of discoveries that might otherwise be kept 
secret, and on that account may contribute to stimulating further 
advances in useful knowledge.  Nevertheless, they concur in expressing 
serious concerns about the potential adverse impacts on the culture and 
practice of academic open science of the legal innovations, and the 
changes of institutional policy among the PROs in response to the 
emphasis that Western governments during the past two decades have 
placed upon near-term goals of ‘wealth creation’ through research.  They 
deem it necessary to emphasise that ‘high quality research is the gateway 
both to advances in knowledge and the wealth creation based on 
science’; that the competitive pursuit of patent rights creates incentives 
for secrecy that generally will be inimical to the rapid advancement of 
knowledge; that intellectual property rights are a basis for the imposition 
of costs, and the threat of costs which ‘can hinder the free flow of ideas 
and information upon which science thrives.’ 73  
Consequently, the recent report of the Royal Society recommends, inter 
alia, the clarification and harmonising of the presently ambiguous 
exemptions from infringement of the patent laws permitted to scientific 
work under the headings ‘private and non-commercial’ and 
‘experimental’ use.74  The same document explicitly calls for reversal of 
                                                        
73 The Royal Society, Keeping Science Open: The Effects of Intellectual Property Policy on the Conduct of 
Science, (Policy document 02/03 (April 2003))  v  <http:// www.royalsoc.ac.uk>. 
74 See, The Royal Society, Keeping Science Open, (April 2003) especially section 3.21 (patents); 
section 4.11–4.20 (copyright); section 5.5 (databases).  
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the recent introduction in UK law – specifically in the statutes 
implementing the Database Directive (1996) and the Copyright Directive 
(2001) - of narrow and ill-defined limitations on the ‘fair dealing’ 
exceptions provided for research; in a departure from traditional 
practice, these exceptions are confined to research that has ‘non-
commercial purposes.’75  Specifically, the Royal Society’s report notes 
that in the law enacting the Database Directive in the UK (on 1 January 
1998), the fair dealing exception for research (and education) permits 
only extraction and not re-utilisation of the protected contents.  Given 
the failure of the exiting statute to accommodate the needs of the 
scientific community in regard to digital databases – a ‘tool’ that has 
acquired increasing importance in numerous research contexts, the 
Royal Society’s report recommends that the laws be revised, so that even 
research that might be regarded as having some commercial value would 
be exempted from infringement of the database right and copyright. 
Salutary as we believe these and related recommendations to be, their 
immediate practical force is mitigated by the fact that effecting 
significant legal reform is more often than not a complex, highly 
politicised and uncertain undertaking.  This is likely to be true 
particularly in the area of intellectual property rights, where determined 
opposition must be expected from entrenched business firms whose 
strategies are predicated upon perpetuation of existing legal 
arrangements, and where the international repercussions and concerns 
for programmes of ‘harmonisation’ – not to mention the conflicts 
between the interests of the industrially advanced and the developing 
nations of the world - are likely to frustrate rapid progress.  
The usefulness of the recommendations contained in those reports is 
further circumscribed by their own recognition that the effects of the 
intellectual property rights regime on the progress of particular fields of 
research, and on specific projects, may be quite different.  Revisions of 
provisions in the intellectual property rights statutes cannot readily 
accommodate the effects of contextual variations without become 
inordinately complicated.  Moreover, if differential rules are introduced 
that are perceived to create advantages for some research areas, or types 
of collaborations, this may induce efforts to reconfigure projects – or at 
                                                        
75 In US legal parlance, such exceptions (to copyright law) are referred to under the heading 
‘fair use’.  
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least to configure the outward appearance in order to exploit such 
advantages.  Lastly, it is relevant to bear in mind that the foregoing 
proposals for legal reform would at best not address the entire problem; 
intellectual property law represents only one among the regulatory 
thickets on the institutional obstacle course and through which 
researchers attempting to advance a particular collaborative project need 
to find a feasible path. 
4.2  Timely Action Through Contractually Constructed 
Collaboration Agreements 
Consequently, it is our view that those who seek to advance 
collaborative e-Science in the here and now will be more effective if 
their attention and efforts focus, not on the codified details of 
intellectual property law, but upon the specific institutional structures 
that can be created contractually to facilitate particular collaborative 
structures that are most suitable to for the work of specific scientific 
projects.  This approach, based upon the development of standard 
contractual clauses, is congruent with the conclusion of legal scholars in 
the US who advocate ‘contractually reconstructing the research 
commons’ as a way to mitigate the adverse effects of ‘a highly 
projectionist intellectual property environment.’76  It also bears some 
kinship with recent initiatives to encourage the creative reuse of 
copyright protected material by providing a variety of readily 
implemented contractual alternatives to the full set of rights available to 
copyright owners under prevailing statutes.77  In the present context, 
contractual construction of an e-Science research commons does not 
require that collaboration agreements must be created de novo for every 
occasion; the principles of modularisation and component 
                                                        
76 See in particular, J H Reichman and P F Uhlir, ‘A Contractually Reconstructed Research 
Commons for Scientific Data in a Highly Protectionist Intellectual Property Environment’ 
(Winter/Spring 2003) 66 (1 and 2) Law and Contemporary Problems 315–462. 
77 A related contractual approach, utilising a menu of machine-readable copyright licenses, has 
been implemented by Creative Commons, a non-profit organisation developed on the initiative of 
Professor Lawrence Lessig (Stanford University, which describes itself as ‘dedicated to the 
creative reuse of copyrighted material’).  For description of collaborative projects and 
organisations that are cooperating with Creative Commons, see 
<http://creativecommons.org/learn/collaborators>.  
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standardisation may be applied as usefully in this sphere as they are in 
the art of software engineering itself.  
A concrete illustration may be given of the way that contractual clauses 
can be used in conjunction with the licensing terms of copyright 
protected software to solve difficult problems involving the balancing of 
different public policy interests.  In the immediate context of the UK e-
Science Programme it is germane to point out how contracts can work 
with existing law protecting intellectual property rights to accommodate 
seeming conflicting objectives of public funding agencies (and PROs), 
specifically in regard to the licensing of middleware and software 
applications tools that are being developed under the EPSRC e-Science 
Core Programme. 
Much of the near-term rationale underlying investment in the 
development of that part of the technical ‘cyberinfrastructure’ rests on 
the contention that if access to data, information and facilities can be 
made easier, and less costly, there will be very substantial efficiency gains 
from the collaborative search for scientific knowledge.  The economic 
case for reinforcing the ‘open science’ mode of collaboration is 
especially compelling in this area, given the modularity of well-
engineered software, and the possibilities of generating recombinant 
novelty through re-use of already developed sub-routines.  This purpose 
would be served by mandating the distribution of publicly funded code 
as free and open source software, making use of the terms of the already 
widely used GNU General Public License (GNU GPL). 
On the other hand, both in government policy circles, among university 
administrators, and individual members of the academic research 
community, it is held to be highly desirable that the knowledge and 
information-goods generated by publicly funded research be available as 
a basis for private sector investment in its further elaboration and 
commercial distribution.  To attain the latter goal by means of 
permitting PROs and their employees to exercise proprietary rights in 
software developed with substantial public support, however, would 
conflict with the rationale for public funding of this kind of R&D: the 
grant of copyright monopolies (and of software patents in some 
jurisdictions) if proved effective, would raise the economic costs of 
utilising the information-goods in question.  This means it would raise 
their cost both as final goods, and as inputs for the production of 
further software innovations, including those by the private sector. 
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A pragmatic solution to this policy dilemma may be available.  The 
proposal has been advanced to allow both goals to the goals to be served 
concurrently in some degree, by means of private contracts permitting 
modifications and further developments based upon publicly funded 
code released as ‘free and open source software.’78  This ingenious use of 
features of the GNU Public License would call for public funding 
agencies in the first instance to mandate that all software created by their 
research projects be released under GNU General Public License 
(requiring distribution of the source codes if along with the machine 
code, among other terms of this standard license); and second, to allow 
the original copyright holder of such programs assign the copyright to 
some non-profit foundation or other entity that would oversee the 
granting of private contracts allowing modifications and elaboration 
upon the GPL’d code for ultimate commercial distribution.  
The details and interpretation of the legal aspects of the GNU GPL that 
would permit this form of ‘dual licensing’ are interesting, but they need 
not be entered into here.  This proposal has been injected into the 
present discussion primarily to illustrate the point that the development 
of contractual clauses (in this instance for commercial exploitation of the 
original extensions based upon GPL’d code) can be a useful device in 
the hands of collaborative public science communities, permitting 
collaborative projects between PRO’s and private sector firms.  In 
addition, this concrete illustration serves to underscore the observation 
that the practical implementation of a novel proposal of this kind 
nonetheless would need to address many of the same institutional issues 
that have been examined by the preceding parts of this chapter.  
Consider just the following two sets of questions about the non-trivial 
practical details of implementing a program of copyleft and dual 
licensing for publicly funded software: 
a) Should a special foundation be created to hold the IP 
rights on publicly funded software, and should each 
funding agency have their own such foundation, or 
should they designate an independent national or 
international entity to which the original copyright 
author (and his/her host institution) would be 
                                                        
78 See R A Ghosh, Copyleft and dual licensing for publicly funded software development, Draft version 
(1.0),  MERIT/Institute of Infonomics, University of Maastricht (July 2003).  
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required ultimately to assign the ownership rights?  Is 
an international or transnational foundation 
politically feasible?  What about charities, such as the 
Wellcome Trust, or the Rockefeller Institutes - would 
they too have to form special foundations to fulfill 
this function, or would they be expected to 
voluntarily require assignment of rights to some pre-
existing foundation(s)?  How would such foundations 
be funded - by retaining a small proportion of the 
royalties garnered under from the private contracts 
that they issued?  Would that create an institutional 
motivation to ‘market’ such permission on revenue-
maximising terms, and if it did would the 
consequences be desirable?  
b)  Are the foundation(s) to which publicly funded 
software would be assigned also to be made 
responsible for negotiating the equivalent of ‘cross-
licensing arrangements’ affecting these private 
contractual permissions?  What would be the 
mechanism for resolving negotiating conflicts among 
individual foundations attached to different funding 
agencies and countries?  What would be the sources 
of such conflicts, and could those be suppressed by 
centralising at least the national assignment of GNU 
GPL licenses to a single entity?  To the extent that 
the ‘dual licenses’ for private exploitation of GPL 
code are really contracts, how would one deal with 
issues of harmonisation among the jurisdictions in 
which such contract can be enforced?79  How can 
those issues be prevented from obstructing 
contracting and cross-licensing agreements among 
those contract holders? 
 
                                                        
79 This is not only a matter of differences among national legal jurisdictions, for, in the US, 
even though there is a uniform federal commercial code contract law is a matter for the State 
courts.  Copyright, and hence ‘copyleft’ licenses avoid this problem because IPR is protected 
under Federal statutes. 
Designing Institutional Infrastructures for e-Science 
 
141
Hence, it may be seen that one of the functions that the assignee 
foundations could perform would be that of establishing uniform 
contractual formulae, including jurisdiction-setting rules for the private 
contractual agreements.  Alternatively, the ABCA or the pre-cursor 
Working Party (both of which were proposed in Part 3 of this chapter) 
could be tasked to provide suitable standard contractual clauses for this 
purpose. A further task of some importance would be to achieve some 
degree of harmonisation of the rules imposed by the funding agencies 
upon the initial holders of copyrights.  Would one want the same search 
algorithm, or encryption programme to be differently ‘regulated’ in 
regard to its commercial exploitation, simply because it had been 
developed under a bioinformatics project supported by the Wellcome 
Trust, rather than by an EPSRC middleware development project?  
Probably not, but, as has already been noted, a policy of ‘one size must 
fit all’ would run the risk of removing flexibility and accommodation to 
the different realities of commercial exploitation opportunities, as well as 
the characteristics of different classes of software.  This vexed issue of 
the appropriate degree of standardisation of the contractual rules for 
‘dual licensing’ is one that certainly could be referred to the proposed 
Advisory Board, as one more problem to be addressed in the course of 
its work - along with others of a kindred nature. 
From the foregoing it may be concluded that the services of an expert 
advisory body will be needed to deal with the many interrelated issues 
that arise in just this one area connection, even were it to be pre-
determined that middleware developed by the e-Science Core Program’s 
projects would all be released under the GNU General Public License.  
The precise form of the novel institutional that has been envisaged here 
as an Advisory Board on Collaboration Agreements is not what really 
matters, although features that assured its independence would be 
essential.  What is required to meet the challenges of adaptive design of 
an appropriate institutional infrastructure, above all, is a guiding, 
architectural vision, and sufficient resources to mobilise and maintain 
the necessary technical expertise: first, to select and standardise the 
contractual components, and then to assess the performance of the 
various collaboration agreement that they have been used to construct.  
An entity able to sustain and assure continuity to those two, intertwining 
tasks ultimately could exert a powerful influence towards realising the 
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global promise of advancing knowledge and improving human welfare 
through e-Science.    
5.  CONCLUSION: THE CHALLENGE OF BUILDING 
NEW INSTITUTIONAL INFRASTRUCTURES FOR 
COLLABORATIVE e-SCIENCE  
The most cursory review of modern sciences’ dependence upon 
distributed digital data and information resources, and their growing 
needs for distributed and pervasive computing resources, suffices to 
reveal why so many distinct research communities view the success of 
technical efforts to provide an advanced ‘digital infrastructure’ as a 
common priority item on their respective requirements lists.  To be sure, 
there are differences in the degrees of enthusiasm expressed about this 
goal and a number of valid questions that can be raised as to whether or 
not ‘the Grid’ is really of equally critical importance for the conduct of 
21st century research in all the principal domain sciences, let alone 
mathematics or the social sciences.  But that is only one, and surely not 
the most important, among the ‘reality checks’ that should be 
undertaken before committing extensive resources to the quest for Grid-
enabled collaborative science as the lead user of the global  cyberinfra-
structure. 
By comparison with the pace of engineering advances, far greater 
uncertainties continue to surround the extent to which individuals, 
groups, and organisations engaged in scientific and technical research are 
able to arrive at informal and formal contractual arrangements and 
institutionalised procedures to reduce the transactions costs of 
collaboration.  The roots of this state of affairs lie in the micro and 
meso-level incentive structures formed by familiar features of the 
established legal and administrative regimes.  Mundane as these obstacles 
may be, those transaction costs, and the economic rents protected by 
intellectual property rights that now occasion greater difficulties in 
negotiating agreements governing interorganisational research 
collaboration, cause private costs to greatly exceed the marginal social 
costs of effective access to data, information and information tools. 
Economic analysis tells us that efficient resource allocation can occur in 
a decentralised regime when the prices of the goods in question are set 
equal to their marginal social costs.  This implies that under modern 
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conditions, the imposition of substantial costs of access to existing data 
and information goods is tantamount to an inefficient tax, resulting in 
the wastage of society’s resources.  That burden is particularly difficult to 
justify on economic or ethical grounds where the initial, fixed costs of 
generating the information already has been borne by society through 
the provision of public funding for research and scholarship.  Reducing 
the size of the transaction cost ‘wedges’, and the rents that are protected 
by intellectual property rights over scientific and technical data and 
information, is therefore an important challenge that must be met - if 
global research communities, and society more generally, are to benefit 
fully from the novel ‘technologies of collaboration’ that now are 
becoming engineering practicalities. 
The same class of ‘soft’ problems underlie the exacting technical 
challenges that have emerged as serious obstacles to the commercial 
provision of Grid services in interorganisational contexts.  Although the 
private incentives for overcoming those problems in the commercial 
sphere may be stronger than those felt by policy-makers with 
responsibilities for public sector research, the latter domain – for all its 
complexities – remains the more hospitable of the two environments for 
experimentation with new approaches to solving these problems.  This is 
the case both because the ethos of cooperation in the collective pursuit 
of knowledge and the informal norms of ‘open science’ still persist in 
many research communities and because the public funding agencies still 
retain an important degree of policy-setting leverage over the relevant 
research organisations and institutions. 
Consequently, it has been argued here that serious efforts should be 
made to explore some of the proposed modalities for the construction 
of an appropriate institutional infrastructure for collaborative e-Science.  
Not only may these yield direct benefits in terms of advancing the state 
of foundational scientific and engineering knowledge, but there can be 
significant spillovers.  Experimentation with new institutional and 
organisation arrangements may yield solutions that find application to 
other fields of collaborative production that are both information 
intensive and regularly transcend the organisational boundaries.  
Of course, it would be desirable for such governmental agencies and 
public research institutions to coordinate on policies that would promote 
‘bottom-up’ initiatives for collaboration within the research 
communities, by more rationally managing publicly (and charitable, 
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quasi-public) funded data and information production and distribution 
in the rapidly progressing digitally networked research environment.80 
Recent proposals of this sort have been advanced for adoption by 
government agencies, featuring a variety of measures, including the 
following: (1) funding of public domain or open access data centres and 
active archives of foundational data sets derived from publicly supported 
research; (2) mandating open access to the scientific data and materials 
needed to replicate published results, and promoting open access to 
those results when they have issues from government-funded research 
projects; (3) providing for regular review and enforcement of research 
contract and grant clauses regarding open data availability, as an essential 
component of the public research infrastructure; and (4) protecting the 
interests of research users by developing open access principles and 
contractual provisions for licensing data products and services to or 
from the private sector, and for privatising the publication of essential 
government information.  
But efforts to coordinate government policies along those lines are not 
sufficient.  They can and should be conjoined with independent 
initiatives to address the immediate practical challenge of devising and 
adapting new institutional mechanisms that will reduce the myriad 
obstacles that add to the transactions costs and restrict the terms of 
interorganisational agreements within which collaborative research is 
hosted by public and charitable research organisations.  Fortunately, 
there already are some encouraging movements in this direction.  
Independent foundations such as those emerging in the field of ‘free and 
open source software’ licensing and private initiatives, such as the 
Science Commons project recently launched by the non-profit 
corporation Creative Commons, are focused on providing research 
communities with licensing contracts formulated to facilitate the ‘some 
                                                        
80 For further elaboration, see P A David and P F Uhlir, Broadening the Information Commons for 
Science and Innovation: Strategic Institutional and Public Policy Approaches, Proposal for the Planning 
Committee on the 2005 CODATA-ICSTI-U.S. NAS Workshop (May 18, 2004); P A David 
and P W Uhlir, ‘Creating the Information Commons for e-Science: An International Workshop 
Plan and Rationale’ (July 2005) 91 Codata Newsletter 
<http://www.codataweb.org/UNESCOmtg/workshopplan.html>. 
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rights reserved’ sharing of scientific information, data, and research 
materials.81  
The negotiation of agreements that can clear researchers’ paths through 
‘patent thickets,’ ‘database barricades,’ and ‘copyright stacks’ is a vital 
task, but it is only one part of the necessary work– as the preceding 
pages have sought to show.  The complexities and uncertainties of 
modern scientific research, and the multiplicity of the participating 
agents and agencies that global e-Science will involve, call for a more 
comprehensive ‘bottom-up’ approach to the contractual reconstruction 
and expansion of the scientific commons.  The proposed development 
of suites of modular contractual clauses, and guidelines for informal 
cooperative procedures that would enable construction of a variety of 
customised, flexible ‘collaboration agreements’, appear to offer a 
practical ‘way forward’ for public funding agencies to encourage and 
endorse.  
In closing, as bromidic and predictable as the academic’s closing plea for 
‘further research’ may be, surely it will be accepted as warranted in the 
present connection.  There is a largely unmet need for empirical 
assessments of the nature and severity of the varied impediments to an 
effectively functioning infrastructure for publicly supported scientific 
and technological collaborations in specific research domains.  
Intrinsically interesting methodological challenges as well as difficult data 
collection tasks lie along the route to systematic measures of the effects 
of the incentives and constraints of such undertakings that are created 
by prevailing organisational norms, institutional rules, and governmental 
policies.  A better understanding of their differential impacts upon the 
direction and conduct of research projects in the various domain 
sciences and upon exploratory work in emerging transdisciplinary fields 
would be of real value in identifying specific targets for remedial 
attention.  Only on the basis of such knowledge will it be practical to 
formulate and implement coordinated strategies of private and public 
                                                        
81 Efforts of this kind are very much in line with the pragmatic spirit of Reichman and Uhlir’s 
(2003) advocacy of efforts to ‘contractually reconstruct the science commons’ in an 
environment characterised by increasingly strong and pervasive intellectual property rights 
protections.  More specific details about the programs being undertaken by Science Commons 
and its relationship to Creative Commons is available at <http://sciencecommons.org>.  It is 
appropriate here to disclose the ‘interest’ of one of the authors ⎯ David is a member of the 
Scientific Advisory Board for Science Commons.   
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action that have a good prospect of freeing distributed collaborative 
research from the persisting constraints of the present mal-adapted 
institutional infrastructure. 
 
